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I. INTRODUCTION
For several years now, open source software products have been
gaining prominence and market share. Yet the products themselves
are not as provocative as the way in which they are developed and
* Ben H. & Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law, Co-Director,
Center for Law, Business & Economics, University of Texas School of Law. I thank Allison
Mann for inspiration and wisdom and Ken Myers for excellent research assistance. I am
grateful to executives at Codeweavers, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, JBoss, Matrix Partners,
Microsoft, MontaVista, MySQL, Novell, the Open Source Development Laboratory, the
Open Source Initiative, Pervasive, Red Hat, and Worldview Capital Partners, who took time
from their schedules to speak with me about the ideas in this paper. I also thank Peggy
Radin, Pam Samuelson, and the participants in the Intellectual Property workshop at Boalt
Hall, for useful comments on an earlier draft.
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distributed. Two related features of the open source model are distinctive: the use of collaborative development structures that extend beyond the boundaries of a single firm, and the lack of reliance on
intellectual property (“IP”) rights as a means of appropriating the
value of the underlying technologies. Firm-level control of intellectual
property is replaced by a complex set of relations, both informal and
sometimes contractual, among strategic partners not joined by firm
boundaries. I argue here that those relations reflect not coalescence
towards industry norms driven solely by superior output, but rather a
series of strategic moves and countermoves that have had the effect of
opening some markets while closing others, substantially reducing
profit margins, and fostering consolidation of a traditionally fragmented industry.
I have written elsewhere about the role of intellectual property
rights in proprietary models of software development, where intellectual property rights are used (albeit somewhat ineffectively) by firms
to exploit the value of their internal research and development
(“R&D”) investments. In that work, I generally reject the idea that the
sheer number of patents is creating a thicket that deters innovation,
largely because of the evidence of a robust startup market and of investors’ lack of concern about patents held by competitors. More generally, I argue that many of the criticisms of software patents fail to
account for the potential benefits those patents provide to smaller
firms and focus much too heavily on the transaction costs associated
with the massive patent portfolios that the larger industry participants
1
have acquired (the so-called “arms race” build up).
Open source development models work differently. Because open
source development proceeds on the premise that no individual or
firm will have proprietary control of the software, the firms participating in those development projects might have little need for patents.
The cooperative nature of development obviates any need for the actual and implicit cross licensing that provides access to technology
throughout the proprietary software sector. The problem, however, is
that the open source community does not exist in a vacuum. It exists
in a world in which participants in the industry are building up large
portfolios of patents, portfolios that pose a serious threat to open
source development. Therefore, any thorough analysis of the role of
patents in the industry must take account of the effects of the current
property rights system on all participants. This Article takes up that
issue.

1. See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEXAS L. REV. 961 (2005); Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital,
and Software Startups, RES. POL’Y (forthcoming), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/
faculty/rmann/info/Data/57.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
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In essence, the problem is that open source developers can and often do operate outside of the IP licensing framework that dominates
the software industry. Thus, many participants have no patents of their
own with which they might protect themselves in IP litigation. At the
same time, at least some portions of this community have developed
software with little regard for the possibility of patent infringement.
Those two practices cannot coexist for long. If the existing legal
framework is not abandoned, then the major open source projects
must acquire patents of their own or they must rely on the patent portfolios held by those who participate in the proprietary model.
Yet some would say that the potential for high-quality software
development through the open source model justifies eradication of
software patents for the entire software industry. More formally, one
potential cost of permitting ready enforcement of software patents is
the disabling of the open source model. At the same time, a sensible
policy analysis must consider the entrepreneurs and small firms struggling to find a foothold in the industry. The property rights that patents offer are closely connected with the survival and success of those
firms. As a result, we must look more closely at the role property
rights play in open source before deciding that the need to free open
source from the constraints of patents justifies abandoning them in the
industry entirely. Yet it is difficult to analyze that problem definitively
in the absence of any objective evidence that would quantify the benefits of open source development or the benefits that the commercial
software industry derives from IP.
The problem becomes more difficult when one considers the
rapid convergence of commercial and open source licensing mod2
els — proprietary companies now often allow access to source code
and the prominent open source licenses discussed below regularly
permit commercial development of proprietary works derived from
the covered products. A complete answer must account for the effects
of those licenses on the character of financial investment in open
source software. For example, the restrictions in common open source
licenses might tend to tilt the scales in favor of proprietary investments in service firms rather than products firms. If it is more difficult
for startups entering the industry to compete in the services sector
than in the products sector, this suggests in turn that the spread of
open source software could promote concentration in the software
industry.
This Article analyzes the role of patent rights in commercialized
open source development models — that is, development models that
are part of business models centered on increasing shareholder returns. Section II is a brief description of the landscape of the industry
2. See, e.g., Microsoft Shared Source Initiative Home Page, http://www.microsoft.com/
resources/sharedsource/default.mspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
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and of the licenses on which open source development depends. Section III considers open source as a challenge to the “one-shop” model
of proprietary software development, explaining how and why firms
in some cases might profit from collaborative development through
open source instead of wholly one-shop proprietary development. Finally, Section IV considers the relationship between open source and
the direction and location of innovation in the industry. This Article
argues that open source development is more likely to support innovation by larger and better-established firms, where proprietary development is at least relatively more accessible to startup and younger
firms.
A Note on Sources
My account of the software industry is based on four sources. The
first three are publicly available. First, I have reviewed the existing
literature, which includes several serious efforts to analyze the indus3
try. Second, I have read a broad array of news accounts relating to
the open source community. Third, I have studied the texts of the actual licenses with considerable care to understand how the licenses in
the industry work. Although some scholars have noted the important
4
distinctions in these licenses, the literature generally has failed to
consider a link between the terms of such licenses and the business
models that are best suited to using those licenses.
The most important source, however, has been a series of indepth interviews and site visits at a variety of large and small firms
engaged with the open source development model. I have spoken with
executives at firms as large as IBM and Microsoft, and with investors
and entrepreneurs in smaller startup firms. Because of the sensitive
nature of the topics addressed in these interviews, I have adopted a
different technique for collecting information than in my previous
work. Specifically, I did not tape or transcribe the interviews, but
rather limited myself to detailed contemporaneous notes. I was free to
ask any questions I liked. Due to the nature of these concerns, and
because I thought it important to obtain access to frank opinions from
executives at large companies, I adopted a restrictive framework for
3. For what I consider the most noteworthy, see STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN
SOURCE (2004); LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS. 99 (2005); Josh Lerner &
Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 20 (2005) [hereinafter Scope of Licensing]; Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (2003).
4. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 3; WEBER, supra note 3; Ieuan G. Mahony & Edward J.
Naughton, Open Source Software Monetized: Out of the Bazaar and into Big Business,
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Oct. 2004, at 1.
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the interviews. Specifically, the interviews for this project were conducted on the understanding that (1) I would not identify the specific
individuals to whom I spoke; (2) I would emphasize that the interviewees expressed their personal views rather than the views of the
firms by which they were employed; (3) my notes of the conversations would remain confidential; and (4) I would not attribute any
5
specific quotations to employees of a particular firm. Because several
of the firms were generous enough to provide access to high-ranking
executives with decision-making authority related to the subject, I
believe that the information from those interviews is uniquely valuable in developing a nuanced understanding of the relation between
proprietary and open source methods of development. I am confident
that I would not have been able to obtain that information by surveys
or by formal on-the-record interviews.
Of course, this does raise the possibility of bias, either in reporting the information from my notes or in selecting firms for interviews.
For this type of project, perhaps the most that can be said is that I was
sensitive to those problems as I selected the interview base and incorporated my notes into this Article. In the end, however difficult it
might be to replicate this information, it is fair to say that my approach does fall squarely within the relevant methodological tradition
in the social sciences. Thus, the concerns with replicability should go
to the weight to be ascribed to the information, rather than its useful6
ness or validity.

II. THE LANDSCAPE
A summary of the development and current state of the software
industry provides a necessary backdrop to the analytical questions on
which this Article focuses. I start with a broad outline of each model
and the core terms of the licenses that shape them.
A. The Proprietary Software Model
1. Formation and Maturation of the Proprietary Software Industry
The software industry came into existence in the mid-1960s when
labor shortages made it difficult for increasingly complex software to

5. In order to ensure a better understanding of this Article, I will cite to information
gleaned from these interviews as “Interviews with Software Executives” where appropriate.
6. For general discussion of this sort of qualitative empirical methodology, see IRVING
SEIDMAN, INTERVIEWING AS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A GUIDE FOR RESEARCHERS IN
EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1998); ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY
RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (3d ed. 2002).
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be produced in-house by each computer user as needed. Sales of
software products grew rapidly throughout the 1970s, and by the
1980s, the United States had a large and well-developed software in8
dustry with more than one thousand firms.
9
The industry has two sectors: products and services. The product
sector further divides into two markets, one for sales to individuals
10
and the other to businesses (called enterprise software). The enterprise software market, in turn, includes products aimed at software
11
12
designers and developers, products targeted directly to end users,
13
and products targeted to hardware developers. The service sector is
less structured. It includes everything from outsourcing the entire IT
function, to maintenance contracts, to custom software design, to
hosted applications delivered via a web browser. The critical distinction between the last category and a prepackaged software product
may be the difference between an upfront license fee and a periodic
rental or access fee.
Though firms in the two sectors rely on substantially different
business models, the line that separates the sectors is a shifting one.
To simplify a complex pattern, it is reasonably accurate to say that
products firms are characterized by higher operating margins, higher
growth rates, and less stable market shares. Services firms have lower
operating margins and lower growth rates, but can more readily establish stable market positions.14 From that perspective, the typical products firm is characterized by high-volume sales of non-customized
products that customers can use “off the shelf” with little or no assistance. At the other end of the spectrum are services firms, which generate revenues by helping firms to install, design, and maintain
software. A large group of hybrid firms fall between. These firms
7. See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE
HEDGEHOG: A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (2003).
8. See id.; MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS OF SOFTWARE (2004); VERNON W.
RUTTAN, TECHNOLOGY, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: AN INDUCED INNOVATION
PERSPECTIVE 338–340 (2001).
9. Although the general distinction between products and services firms draws on
CUSUMANO, supra note 8, the further breakdown in this paragraph is my own.
10. A number of products firms earn revenues in other ways. For example, firms that develop search technology typically rely heavily on advertising revenues.
11. Examples would include web development tools, graphics tools, server software, operating systems, and firmware.
12. These products are likely to be marketed through value-added resellers, channel distributors, system integrators, or independent vendors. They include database programs,
office suites, and various vertical industry applications.
13. Examples here would include the various operating systems and simpler programs
developed for integration into the varied array of electronic devices that rely on computer
processing.
14. See John Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents, and
Entry, 85 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). Products firms are more likely to use patents
than services firms.
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generally started by attempting to sell products but subsequently were
forced by market conditions to provide ever-increasing levels of customization thus degrading their ability to sell high volumes of a high15
margin product.
A remarkable lack of concentration characterizes the software in16
dustry as a whole. The industry’s CR4 ratio is only thirty-nine per17
cent, and its HHI is less than six hundred (where an HHI of one
thousand or more qualifies an industry as only moderately concen18
trated). Census Bureau statistics report more than fifty thousand
19
firms in the industry as of 2002. Last year, nearly five hundred firms
20
in the industry had more than $1 million in sales, and venture capi21
talists invested more than $4.7 billion in software firms. As I discuss
in Section IV, the lack of concentration has considerable implications
for the competitive structure of the industry and its openness to innovation.
The lack of concentration is attributable largely to low barriers to
22
entry. Firms typically enter and exit with great frequency. Because
the venture capital model that supports most new firms entering the
23
industry better suits products firms than services firms, products
firms are more likely to receive financing. New services firms, although not unheard of, are less common and tend to evolve naturally

15. See CUSUMANO, supra note 8.
16. The industry CR4 is the concentration ratio of, or percentage of total market sales accounted for by, the top four firms in the industry (here software firms).
17. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (“HHI”) assesses concentration by summing the
squares of the individual market shares of all participants.
18. I calculated these measures using the 2002 software sales for firms in the Software
500, the five hundred largest software firms by revenue. My calculations overstate industry
concentration to the extent that they ignore software sales by firms outside the Software
500. Conversely, concentration figures would be much higher if the industry were broken
down into smaller sectors.
19. In the most recent economic census, there were more than 9900 firms in NAICS 5112
(Software
Publishers),
Industry
Statistics
Sampler:
NAICS
5112,
http://www.census.gov/econ/census02/data/industry/E5112.HTM, and more than 48,000
firms in NAICS 541511 (Custom Computer Programming Services), Industry Statistics
Sampler:
NAICS
541511,
http://www.census.gov/econ/census02/data/industry/
E541511.HTM.
20. See supra note 18.
21. 2005 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS MONEYTREE REPORT 2 (2005), available at
http://pwcmoneytree.com/exhibits/05Q4MoneyTreeReport_FINAL.pdf.
22. In 2005, 246 software firms received their first round of venture capital financing.
Between 1995 and 2005, there were nearly 3,800 first-sequence investments in the software
industry. PricewaterhouseCoopers MoneyTree Report Historical Trend Data,
http://www.pwcmoneytree.com/exhibits/NationalAggregateData95Q1-06Q2-FINAL.xls.
Many of the firms that received financing during that period have failed. See Mann & Sager,
supra note 1.
23. See Mann & Sager, supra note 1; see also CUSUMANO, supra note 8.
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from incumbent or rising products firms adapting to market pres24
sures.
2. Software Licensing Under Proprietary Models
An important feature of the evolutionary tension between products firms and services firms is the treatment of source code. Traditionally, hybrid or service firms that sold custom-designed products
provided the source code to the user, but with restrictions designed to
25
prevent further disclosure. Until about 1990, the standard license
agreements for prepackaged products generally did not make the
source code available at all. This led to increasing compatibility problems between software and hardware components because software
26
developers did not have access to one another’s source code.
The rise of the Internet and network computing, both of which
have increased the technical complexity of software, exacerbated the
27
interoperability problem. The problem is particularly acute for infrastructure and enterprise products, as opposed to end-user applications
that tend to be easier to install. The commoditization of “middle28
ware” made custom software less dominant in the enterprise space
and increased the importance of easy compatibility. It is difficult to
sell a commodity that does not easily interact with other commoditized products that provide associated functionality. The technical
complexity of software underscored the need for transparency in
software design, as many sophisticated users increasingly began to
desire not only a functional software product but also a product that
users might be able to understand, replicate, and modify.
Thus, there is a strong market-based need for collaboration in the
29
development of “platform” products. Although there obviously was
30
competition among firms to own the “platform,” a one-firm platform would present the long-term problem of slowed technological
innovation, as that firm’s interests naturally would conflict with those
of the other firms attempting to provide products and services on the
platform.

24. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. By middleware, I refer to software that operates as an intermediary between different
applications and provides core functionality, such as web servers, applications servers, and
database management systems.
29. A platform product is a piece of software that provides functions on which other applications are based.
30. For a theoretical discussion of the economics of that problem, see Douglas Lichtman,
Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000).
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Theoretically, a workable method for top-down articulation of
platform standards or interfaces could have avoided this problem.
This has not happened. The industry has not been able to reach a consensus on the relation between patents and standards. Some groups
advocate the adoption of standards that will be patent-free, hoping to
avoid the possibility that a patentee can tax any substantial portion of
standard-based Internet activity. As it happens, however, patented
technology knowingly has been adopted into standards in some cases,
and there have been several notable incidents where patents were dis31
covered after a standard was implemented.
Others advocate the mandatory licensing of intellectual property
rights incorporated into standards. They recognize the difficulty of
establishing a property-free zone in which to articulate standards.
Stakeholders dispute whether the licenses, besides being “reasonable
and non-discriminatory” (“RAND”), must also be royalty-free. The
most prominent organization, the World Wide Web Consortium
(“W3C”), generally has taken the view that participants in a standards
32
process must contribute their patents royalty-free. That approach,
however, has the potential to drive patentees from the process, which
in turn could deprive the resulting standards of the best technology
available. Moreover, if the adopted standard turns out to infringe an
essential patent of a departed patentee, then that party could refuse to
license its patent entirely or impose unreasonable terms and conditions on those seeking to implement the standard. Many patentees in
the industry instead insist that a better approach is to permit a standard
to incorporate patents licensed on a RAND basis even if they are not
33
fully royalty-free.
Recently, cost pressures have given open source products an important entry point into the commercial market. Among other things,
those products are attractive because of their ability to facilitate lower
34
hardware costs by preventing vendor lock-in. Furthermore, sophisticated enterprises are more willing to take a risk on a potentially com35
plex installation and integration process. The early dissemination
and widespread adoption of Linux and Apache — both free of cost
31. See Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry Standards:
The Risks to Enforceability Due to Conduct Before Standard-Setting Organizations, 30 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N. Q.J. 95 (2002).
32. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 303–11. The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (“OASIS”) recently revised its patent policy to accommodate
but not require royalty-free licenses. OASIS - Who We Are - Intellectual Property Rights,
http://www.oasis-open.org/who/intellectualproperty.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). Even
the W3C policy permits royalties through an opt-out provision. See W3C Patent Policy, § 7,
Feb. 5, 2004, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205.
33. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
34. See Eric S. Raymond, THE MAGIC CAULDRON (2000), http://www.catb.org/~esr/
writings/cathedral-bazaar/magic-cauldron/index.html.
35. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
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and of demonstrated quality — exemplified these bases for accepting
open source products. In contrast, open source has made much more
limited inroads in the consumer space. This is true, at least in part,
because Microsoft’s existing products are much less risky for the
typical consumer to install and integrate, yet still offer considerable
36
quality in comparison to existing open source alternatives.
3. Cross-Licensing: the Proprietary Equilibrium
37

As I have explained elsewhere, the widespread use of cross licensing of patented technologies is a key feature of the mature proprietary software development model. The increasing complexity and
interdependence of innovation in the industry have made it important
for all of the major firms to have access to the intellectual property of
the other major firms in the industry. Many of the most important
firms are developing and selling products that at least arguably infringe in some way on patents held by several other major players in
the industry. The major firms could test the relative strengths of their
portfolios through litigation, but instead have chosen for the most part
to enter a web of cross-licensing agreements. Under those agreements,
whether formal and explicit or informal and tacit, most of the large
firms generally have access to all of the intellectual property held by
the other large firms. Those firms for the most part compete against
each other based on the strength of their product design and market38
ing, not on the strength of their IP portfolios.
B. The Open Source Development Model
As a method of software production, open source dates back to
the earliest days of commercial computing, when businesses using
IBM computers in the early 1950s collaborated on the task of design39
ing software for their machines. The modern history of open source,
however, begins with the birth of UNIX in 1969. Starting with a few
months of programming by Ken Thompson at his California home,
UNIX developed into a widely used and respected operating system

36. Id.
37. See Mann, supra note 1.
38. The strength of the IP portfolios remains relevant. IBM, for instance, has the strongest patent portfolio in the industry and earns hundreds of millions of dollars in licensing fees
each year. As a result, other firms have an incentive to increase the strength of their portfolios to lower the net sums they must expend on cross-licensing agreements with IBM. Most
other cross-licensing agreements do not involve monetary payments. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
39. CAMPBELL-KELLY, supra note 7.
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that has become the ultimate source of many of the most successful
40
operating systems in use today.
For purposes of this Article, the most important of the open
source projects is GNU, begun by Richard Stallman in 1984 as an
effort to create an operating system that would offer the benefits of
the UNIX operating system but include sufficient new code to avoid
the ownership questions that plagued the distribution of UNIX for
decades. GNU became a viable operating system when Linus Torvalds contributed a working kernel to the project in 1994, at which
point the software came to be known as GNU/Linux (or more commonly in recent years, just Linux). From that point, the Linux operating system has evolved through a rapid collaborative process in which
a large, worldwide community of programmers routinely read, redistribute, and modify the source code to improve it. It is subject to the
General Public License (“GPL”), one of the earliest, most widely
41
used, and most restrictive of the open source licenses.
As the history of Linux suggests, open source holds its greatest
promise for platform products. The market need is greatest for platform products because of the importance of a reliable promise that
vendor lock-in will not endanger the survival of products built or
42
modified on the software stack above that platform. It is more important in ensuring interoperability to have access to the source code
of platform products on which middleware and applications must be
stacked. Further, collaborative development has its highest potential
in the area of platform products, where firms specializing in different
parts of a value chain have joint incentives to participate in the development of a high quality product that is broadly accessible. In that
context, open source traditionally has been linked to powerful brands,
like Linux, Apache, and Perl. Still, some of the modern open source
products have moved beyond that niche. The Firefox web browser, for
43
example, is a product gaining recent popularity that is not, at least in
44
its current manifestations, primarily a platform product.
40. WEBER, supra note 3, at 20–53.
41. See id. at 54–55, 94–109.
42. Vendor lock-in seems to be a particular concern for government procurement. See
K.D. Simon, The Value of Open Standards and Open-Source Software in Government Environments, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 227 (2005).
43. After releasing several browsers that did not succeed in the market for various reasons, in November 2004, the Mozilla Foundation released Firefox (using second-generation
Netscape code). Firefox has been an immediate success. As of July 2006, it is estimated that
Firefox has a 13 percent share of the browser market, compared to 83 percent for IE and 2
percent for Safari. Alexandra DeFelice, Firefox Claims Bigger Chunk of Browser Market,
LINUXINSIDER, July 12, 2006, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/51736.html.
44. To be sure, the rise of web application “mash-ups” and similar services suggests at
least a possibility that the Firefox browser (or some competitor) ultimately will become a
major platform for distributed applications. See Elinor Mills, Mapping a Revolution with
NEWS.COM,
Nov.
17,
2005,
http://news.com.com/
‘Mashups’,
CNET
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1. The Current State of Open Source: Commercialization
Some open source programs are created almost entirely through
45
the efforts of volunteers, as in the early days of Linux. As others
have recognized, a key part of an open source project is attracting tal46
ented and motivated individuals. Even now, most important projects
47
have roots in self-organized collaborative activity. Yet the events of
the last few years show that the ties between open source communities
and large incumbent (proprietary) firms are increasing rapidly. A substantial share of the important Linux contributors now have gainful
employment either directly for the Open Source Development Labs
48
(“OSDL”) or for one of its major supporters. Indeed, the location of
such a high share of the “important” contributors in such posts is one
of the reasons OSDL executives have been optimistic about their ability to obtain consent from enough of those contributors to succeed in
49
50
Moreover, dual-licensing firms
(like
reversioning the GPL.
MySQL) generally directly employ almost all of those who contribute
to their projects. Firms can reject any code submitted by individuals
who are not interested in employment with the company. The increasing ties between proprietary firms and open source projects illustrate
how far the open source development model has evolved from the
UNIX hacker days of the 1970s.

Mapping+a+revolution+with+mashups/2009-1025_3-5944608.html; Ryan Singel, Are You
Ready for Web 2.0?, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/
technology/0,1282,69114,00.html.
45. SourceForge.net lists tens of thousands of open source projects. However, it seems
likely that only a few of those projects have any significant impact on IT. See Scope of
Licensing, supra note 3 (analyzing SourceForge data).
46. See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR (1999); Yochai Benkler,
Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Jeffrey
A. Roberts et al., Understanding the Motivations, Participation, and Performance of Open
Source Software Developers: A Longitudinal Study of the Apache Projects, 52 MGMT. SCI.
984 (2006); see also Justin Pappas Johnson, Open Source Software: Private Provision of a
Public Good, 11 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 637 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of
Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Raymond,
Magic Cauldron, supra note 34.
47. In recent years, proprietary companies have tried, with varying levels of success, to
start projects by releasing proprietary code as open source software. Examples include Netscape’s release of its browser source code in 1998 which eventually formed the basis of
Firefox, IBM’s 2004 release of Cloudscape to the Apache Foundation, and Sun’s release of
the source code for Solaris 10.
48. See Daniel Lyons, Peace, Love, and Paychecks, FORBES, Sept. 20, 2004,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/0920/180.html (discussing corporate sponsorship of key
Linux contributors).
49. Cf. Keith Regan, Browser Rumors Renewed as Google Hires Firefox Programmer, ECOMMERCE TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/40015.html (reporting that Google hired the developer most responsible for the Firefox browser).
50. Dual licensing firms are firms that use separate licenses for two closely related products, one open source and one proprietary.
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The availability of venture financing affects the ways open source
firms enter the market. It is difficult to obtain financing for a product
that will be distributed without charge, for which the source code will
remain open if the product succeeds, and which (like all software
products) may never succeed for technical or market-based reasons.
Although some of the interviewees suggest that there are a “huge
number” of startups building on Linux, it is not clear how to evaluate
51
that suggestion. To gain perspective, I used VentureXpert to identify
venture capital investments in firms that develop open source software. As of August 2006, I found deals involving 135 U.S. firms —
about eighty percent of which are in the software and Internet sectors — whose business descriptions contain the terms “Linux,”
“Apache” or “open source.” By any standard, that is a small part of
the relevant startup market. By comparison, nearly 8000 firms have
received venture financing in the software and Internet sectors between 1998 and August 2006 (the period during which ninety-five
percent of the open source investments were made). It appears that
few of those firms are actually profiting directly from open source
technology. Many simply offer heterogeneous (or cross-platform)
52
operating system support, including Linux or Windows, or provide
proprietary applications that can be used on either a Windows or
53
Linux platform, or, on occasion, provide proprietary applications
54
that can be used only on a Linux platform.
Some of the most interesting startups are not making open source
products, but rather are strategically capitalizing on the tension between proprietary and open source development models. Black Duck
and Palamida, for example, are two start-up firms that make software
designed to assist the commingling of open source and proprietary
technology. Several firms sell technology designed to link computers
55
running different operating systems. Open Source Risk Management sells legal protection against copyright and patent infringement
litigation related to open source products.56 Finally, some firms (like
Red Hat, Covalent Technologies, MySQL, JBoss, and, formerly, SCO
Group) are distributors of so-called “professional” open source products, special proprietary or quasi-proprietary versions of traditional
open source products.
51. VentureXpert is a source for information about venture capital and private equity
funds. VentureXpert, http://www.venturexpert.com (last visited November 13, 2006).
52. E.g. Mission Critical Linux.
53. E.g. Altiris, Atempo, and PERSIST Technologies.
54. E.g. Aduva, Eazel, Eternal Systems, Qlusters, and Scalix.
55. E.g. Cassatt, Centrify, Steeleye Technology, and Vintela.
56. There are other firms that are not focusing on risk management per se, but that are
capitalizing on the lack of interoperability between open source and proprietary operating
systems. CodeWeavers, for example, offers a software product that facilitates the use of
Windows applications on Linux.
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This is not to say that it is impossible to have a successful venture-backed startup with a purely open source product. For example,
MontaVista Software has been gaining considerable traction in the
production of cutting-edge operating systems for embedded devices
and cell phones. It is obtaining license fees for purely open source
operating systems, based almost entirely on its ability to promise
speed to the market. With little copyright or patent protection against
duplication of its products, this is a difficult route, but it may not be
an impossible one.
Similarly, a few firms have obtained venture financing after their
open source product was distributed, modified, and already a market
success. When developers at the University of Cambridge developed
Xen (software that lets hardware run multiple operating systems) and
distributed it openly through two versions, they were then able to
form a firm, XenSource, with $6 million of venture backing. That
financing was used, in turn, to support work on a third version of the
product, the distribution of professional releases tailored for different
environments, and product support. The notable point is that the innovative activity preceded the financing. This contrasts starkly with the
financing model for firms pursuing proprietary software strategies,
where little or no development or deployment is likely to occur before
57
first financing.
Another possibility is to start with open source code as the platform on which to build a proprietary product. Several venture capitalists suggest that this type of startup is increasingly common.58 The
basic expectation here is that the startups will build proprietary products on open source platforms, and that the open source nature of the
platform will make it easier for the startup to integrate its work with
the platform. As time goes on, it may well be that this will become an
increasingly common method for the development of proprietary
software. That type of development is still at an early stage. For now,
an open source foundation is still likely to be an obstacle to sophisticated venture-backed financing.
2. Software Products Licenses Under Open Source Models
At the center of all of this is the license that governs the use of the
code. Perhaps the most important distinction between proprietary and
open source licensing involves the parties to the licenses. For the proprietary products discussed in the preceding section, the arrangement
is simple: a license runs directly from each developer that publishes a
57. See Mann & Sager, supra note 1.
58. See Martin LaMonica, Open Source, Open Wallet, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Open+source,+open+wallet/2100-7344_3-5934144.html (discussing
venture capital investments in open source-related startups).
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product to each end user of the product. For open source projects,
however, the arrangements are more complex, with two separate
stages of licensing. First, in the contribution stage, dispersed communities of programmers produce lines of code that they contribute to a
particular development project. Typically, the copyright in the contributed code rests either with the contributor or one of several nonprofit entities (such as the Free Software Foundation) that acquires the
copyright through assignment. When the copyright is not assigned, the
contributor typically licenses the code to the project under the relevant
59
license. Second, in the distribution stage, the software product is
distributed under the terms of an open source license. This license
restricts the rights of the user in the code.
To qualify as an open source license, a license must have Open
60
Source Initiative (“OSI”) certification. To become certified, a license must meet a set of minimum requirements designed to ensure
that software is distributed with its source code and that it is reasonably available without constraint to developers and users who wish to
61
use or modify it for their own purposes. Those requirements are not
logically necessary to solve the interoperability and transparency
problems discussed above. A proprietary developer could arguably
achieve the same ends with an aggressive program of sharing source
62
code with developers and major customers. Throughout the 1990s,
however, prior to the development of such shared source programs,
the absence of any response to those issues played a major role in the
rise of open source. Moreover, a shared source program cannot solve
the concerns about vendor lock-in that motivate many enterprises to
choose open source rather than proprietary platforms.

59. This can create difficulties when those operating the project later wish to alter the license under which the product is distributed (known in the industry at “reversioning”),
because they are likely to need consent from the original contributors.
60. The OSI is a non-profit organization founded in 1998 by Bruce Perens and Eric Raymond. Generally, it supports a broad conception of open source software that is more tolerant of commercial interaction than the Free Software Foundation’s conception. For my
purposes, the most important of the OSI’s activities is its promulgation of the Open Source
Definition, the generally accepted indicator that a particular license should be regarded as
“open source.” See OSI — The Open Source Definition, http://www.opensource.org/
docs/definition_plain.php (last visited October 11, 2006).
61. Version 1.9 of the Open Source Definition includes the following requirements: free
redistribution must be tolerated; source code must be included; the creation and distribution
of derivative works must be tolerated; the license cannot discriminate against particular
users or fields of endeavor; rights under the license must extend to all users whether or not
they have executed a formal license; the license cannot be restricted to use of the program as
part of a specific product; the license cannot restrict other software solely because it is distributed with the licensed software; and the license must be technology-neutral. Id.
62. Indeed, Microsoft’s shared source program is designed to address these ends. See Microsoft and Open Source (Oct.18, 2005), http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/
Articles/MicrosoftandOpenSource.mspx.
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Aware of those issues, open source communities have established
a baseline, embodied in the OSI requirements, that must now be met
before any project can take advantage of the formal and informal infrastructure that has arisen to support open source development. Beyond those basic requirements, however, the licenses differ in a
number of ways that affect the commercial development of the li63
censed software. For the present discussion, the licenses differ most
importantly in three ways: (1) the constraints on incorporation of the
licensed code in later products; (2) the rules about the contribution of
IP rights related to contributed code; and (3) the rules about enforce64
ment of IP rights by users of the software.
The first has traditionally been the major point of differentiation
among open source licenses. There is a readily discernible continuum,
from “reciprocal” licenses (like the GPL) at one end to “academic”
licenses (like BSD) at the other. The oft-debated § 2(b) of the GPL,
for example, provides that its restrictions must apply not only to the
original GPL code but also to any “modified work” that includes GPL
code unless “identifiable sections” of the modified work “can be rea65
sonably considered independent and separate works in themselves.”
Thus, the license reflects a concept of reciprocal obligation. Developers are free to take advantage of the contributions reflected in an existing piece of GPL code, provided they make a reciprocal contribution
66
of their modifications under the GPL model. The scope of restric-

63. An interesting problem that warrants further inquiry is why open source licenses continue to proliferate. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 235–38. It would make more sense for a
relatively small number of standard forms to begin to dominate, but it continues to be the
case that new projects often result in newly developed licenses, like the new Community
Development and Distribution License Sun devised for its Solaris contribution. Historically,
the classic licenses like the GPL, GNU Lesser General Public License (“LGPL”), Berkeley
Software Distribution (“BSD”), and MIT licenses dominated significant projects until the
late 1990s, but starting with the release of Mozilla in 1998 the number of licenses approved
by OSI has increased rapidly. As I write, fifty-eight separate licenses have been approved.
This problem has gained increasing attention in recent years, largely because of the increasing difficulty of combining software code written within different licensing domains. The
underlying fear is not so much that a particular project (like Linux) will split into separate
projects as it is that the open source community as a whole will become a number of effectively separate gated communities. See id. at 247–53.
64. This section draws heavily on the terminology and analysis of ROSEN, supra note 3.
65. The GNU Public License § 2(b) (June 1991), http://www.opensource.org/
licenses/gpl-license.php. A similar provision appears in § 5 of the Second Discussion Draft
of GPLv3, which is currently under consideration by the Free Software Foundation. GPLv3,
2nd Discussion Draft (July 27, 2006), http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl-draft-2006-07-27.html.
66. I do not address here whether the licenses are binding as a matter of contract or
through rules of property rights. On that point, Peggy Radin has suggested in conversations
with the author that the property rights argument is quite weak. The absence of robust
mechanisms for execution similarly undermines the idea that they operate by creating contractual obligations. Of course, because the right to use the software is likely to depend on
the existence of a license, the absence of any contractual obligation will be important only
in cases where stopping subsequent use is not an adequate remedy. The main example of
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67

tions imposed by that provision is debatable, but it certainly imposes
at least some constraint on the ability of a developer to incorporate
68
GPL code into a fully proprietary product. If anything, it appears
that the pending revisions to the GPL will exacerbate the problem
rather than mitigate it. Among other things, it seems likely that the
next version of the GPL will forbid the integration of GPL-licensed
software into products that employ digital rights management technology, largely because of a philosophical objection that Free Soft69
ware Foundation principals have for such technology.
At the other end of the spectrum, “academic” licenses like the
BSD license impose no such constraints on distribution, requiring
only that distributors include the code and give appropriate credit. The
concept of those licenses is that work prepared solely for academic
purposes should be freely available to the entire community to use as
70
it sees fit with no strings attached. For example, Microsoft easily
71
can, and does, include some BSD code in its operating system.
Other major licenses have an effect similar to the BSD license, though
they state it more explicitly. The Mozilla Public License (“MPL”), for
example, states in § 3.7:
You may create a Larger Work by combining Covered Code with other code not governed by the terms
of this License and distribute the Larger Work as a
single product. In such a case, You must make sure

this is likely to be in the provisions that purport to govern enforcement of patent rights by
users of the software.
67. Compare, e.g., James V. Delong, The Enigma of Open Source Software (Version
1.0), A1–A13 (Mar. 2004), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop11.8opensource.pdf (a
highly expansive interpretation) with ROSEN, supra note 3 (a much narrower interpretation).
68. Typical reciprocity provisions apply only when the work is “distributed.” See The
GNU Public License, supra note 65. With the rise of application service providers, that
leaves a loophole that would permit commercial exploitation of a derivative work without
distribution. Accordingly, newer licenses extend the reciprocity provision to include any
“external deployment” of the derivative work that makes the work available to users over a
computer network. See, e.g., Apple Public Source License (Version 2.0) § 2.2 (Aug. 6,
2003), http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl; Real Networks Public Source License Version 1.0 § 2.1(b), http://www.opensource.org/licenses/real.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2006);
Open Software License (Version 2.1) § 5 (2004), http://www.opensource.org/licenses/osl2.1.php; see also ROSEN, supra note 3, at 193–95.
69. See David Berlind, Controversy over GPLv3 Draft Reflects the ‘Incompatibility’ of
DRM with Open Source, ZDNET, July 28, 2006, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=3399.
70. The concept behind that license resonates strongly with the academic community’s
notions of motivation and intellectual contribution. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic
Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1988); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology, 97
YALE L.J. 177 (1987).
71. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.

18

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 20

the requirements of this License are fulfilled for the
72
Covered Code.
Sun’s new Common Development and Distribution License
(“CDDL”), which governs its contribution of Solaris, includes a sub73
stantially identical provision (§ 3.6). Similarly, the Apache License
(Version 2.0) provides in § 4: “You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or
without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that
You [give recipients a copy of the license, include ‘prominent notices’
74
of your changes, and include appropriate attribution notices].”
The second crucial point of differentiation among the licenses is the
coverage of intellectual property rights held by those who contribute
to the project. The traditional practice has been to rely on the understanding that any party who contributed to an open source project
would grant an implied license that permitted ordinary uses of the
75
resulting software. Licenses like the GPL and the BSD that do not
explicitly deal with the intellectual property rights retained by contributors must rely on that concept.76 Recent licenses deal with the
subject more directly, requiring specific copyright and patent licenses
77
from all contributors to all users. Indeed, the Apache Software
Foundation has developed a separate Apache Contributor License
78
Agreement designed specifically to respond to this problem. The
proposed GPLv3 takes a slightly different tack, including a covenant
79
not to assert patent claims as opposed to a traditional license.
For this discussion, what is most interesting about those licenses
is the care with which they limit the patent rights that the contributor
grants. For example, § 2.1 of the Mozilla Public License carefully
limits the patent grant of the initial developer (Netscape) to cover only
72. Mozilla Public License § 3.7, http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/MPL-1.1.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
73. Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0 § 3.6 (Dec. 17, 2004),
http://www.sun.com/cddl/cddl.html.
74. Apache License, Version 2.0 §§ 2–3 (Jan. 2004), http://www.apache.org/
licenses/LICENSE-2.0.
75. GPL, supra note 65. Section 7 does include a provision barring redistribution by any
party that is prevented by a patent license from tolerating royalty-free distribution. Although
that strongly suggests what is obviously expected, it does not rise to the level of an express
grant of IP rights by contributors.
76. As Rosen explains, there are numerous technical problems with relying on implied
licenses, such as whether the license extends to patents that have not yet been issued at the
time of the contribution or to later versions of the open source project that do not exist at the
time of the contribution. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 79, 126–127.
77. See, e.g., Apache License, supra note 74, §§ 2–3; Common Development and Distribution License, supra note 73, §§ 2.1–2.2.
78. See Apache Software Foundation Individual Contributor License Agreement V2.0,
http://www.apache.org/licenses/icla.txt (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
79. See GPLv3, 2nd Discussion Draft, supra note 65, § 11.
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patents that are necessary to the use of the Original Code. Thus, if
Netscape had at the time it contributed the Original Code a patent that
was not infringed by the Original Code, but was infringed by a new
module added to that code later, nothing in the MPL would require
Netscape to license that patent to subsequent users of the code.81 A
slightly different twist comes from IBM’s Common Public License,
which excludes from the patent grant a license to any patent not issued at the time of the contribution, even if an application already was
82
on file.
The final point of differentiation is how the licenses deal with the
risk of allegations of patent infringement. On this point, proprietary
licenses often indemnify users against patent infringement claims
filed by third parties. That is not, however, practical in the open
source context. There, the “licensor” of any particular program is of83
ten a distributed body of difficult-to-identify contributors. Open
84
source licenses generally impose the infringement risk on licensees.
The response to the problem thus is limited to creating incentives of
various degrees designed to deter users of the program from instituting patent litigation by the threat of withdrawing further rights to use
85
the open source program. It is difficult to weigh the effect of those
provisions. For successful programs that become “mission-critical,” it
is easy to see that they would have a powerful effect. For less important programs that a user easily could abandon, the provisions would
be less effective.
What is most interesting is the great variation in the provisions
focusing on third party IP, primarily because it suggests more conscious attention to the importance of protecting patent rights than one
would expect given the mythology of a patent-free open source
movement. For example, § 8 of the MPL provides that a suit claiming
that a contributor’s version of the software violates a patent will result
80. It appears that the desire to delimit this grant so carefully was one of the main reasons
for the development of the MPL in preference to the then-existing reciprocal license forms.
Cf. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 147–50.
81. See id. at 148–150. This is similar to the definition of “essential patent claims” that is
used in § 11 of the proposed GPLv3. See GPLv3, 2nd Discussion Draft, supra note 65, § 11.
82. See
Common
Public
License
§
2,
http://www.opensource.org/
licenses/cpl1.0.php (last visited October 11, 2006); ROSEN, supra note 3, at 163–66.
83. This is particularly true for programs governed by licenses like the GPL that do not
directly provide for sublicensing, but rather contemplate licenses directly from each contributor to each user.
84. The closest thing to a warranty of noninfringement is the warranty of “provenance”
that appears in many of the modern open source licenses, in which the contributor states it
“believes” that its contributions are its original creations and noninfringing. See Mozilla
Public License, supra note 72, § 3.4(c); see ROSEN, supra note 3, at 158, 198–201.
85. See, e.g., Apache License, supra note 74, § 3; MPL, supra note 72, § 8.2. As a related
matter, licenses also often require contributors to include notice of patent problems of which
they might be aware. See MPL, supra note 72, § 3.4.
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in a termination of the plaintiff’s rights to use that version of the software. Furthermore, a suit against any contributor to an MPL project
for any other form of patent infringement will lead to a termination of
the right to use any contribution of that participant to any MPL prod86
uct. Perhaps the broadest provision appears in § 12.1(c) of the Apple
Public Source License, which terminates “if You . . . commence an
action for patent infringement against Apple; provided that Apple did
87
not first commence an action for patent infringement against You.”
Those provisions have a fascinating effect because they generally
operate not only to protect the products in question, but also to slowly
bring open source products within the cross-licensing equilibrium that
has provided stability to the proprietary segment of the industry for
some time. At the same time, those provisions often seem unpalatable
to companies with large patent portfolios because they require them to
forgo claims under that portfolio for products unrelated to the open
source project in which they are participating. This has spurred the
drafting of weaker patent defense provisions, such as the one in the
current version of § 10 of the Open Software License and the Academic Free License, which terminates a license for the contributed
88
work only for a claim against the contributed work. By excluding
termination based on the exercise of patent rights against unrelated
software, it is thought, the provision makes participation in and use of
open source projects more palatable for firms with large patent portfo89
lios.
The most interesting recent development is the proposed extension in GPLv3 of the patent retaliation provision. It would prohibit a
company not only from distributing GPL software, but also from using modified versions on their own servers. For example, assume that
a company like HP prepares a modified version of a GPL program,
which it runs on its own servers but does not distribute, and that HP
obtains patents that protect the functionality that HP has added. Under
the current GPL, HP would be free to assert those patents against any
later innovator that attempted to incorporate the patented functionalities into the GPL program. However, under GPLv3, any such suit
would vitiate HP’s right to run its modified version of the GPL pro90
gram on its own servers. It should be no surprise that this provision

86. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 155.
87. Apple Public Source License, supra note 68, § 12.1(c).
88. Open Software Library, supra note 68, § 10; see also Apache License, supra note 74,
§ 3 (containing a similar provision).
89. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 217–18.
90. See GPLv3, 2nd Discussion Draft, supra note 65, § 2. The rationale described in the
text is set out in a separate document. See Opinion on Patent Retaliation,
http://gplv3.fsf.org/patent-dd2.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
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is controversial, drawing stern criticism not only from HP, but also
91
from as venerable a figure as Linus Torvalds.

III. MOTIVATIONS FOR THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OPEN
SOURCE
A. Open Source as a Viable Business Model
Open source development is aptly viewed as a direct challenge to
the traditional “one shop” model of proprietary software development.
The question is how to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two business models. The important differences are easily
summarized.
In the proprietary model, the coordination, funding, and direction
of research and development are accomplished within the boundaries
of a single firm. The advantages of the model are the same as those of
bringing any complex activity within the boundaries of a single firm:
the firm is able to collect resources from investors and then decide
how best to allocate those resources to maximize the effectiveness of
any particular development project. The ability to make rapid responses to new and surprising events is a strong advantage of the proprietary model.92
In the open source model, by contrast, control is more diffuse,
with development proceeding through relatively decentralized hierarchies.93 The strength of open source development is its potential to
produce products with a higher quality and more innovative character
than similar proprietary products. Discourse from supporters often
reflects a deep-seated, at times almost mystical, conviction that collaborative development is superior to centrally directed development.
The argument resonates strongly with the recent literature on open
innovation.94 In that context, advocates have focused on the ability of
a collaborative and decentralized development process to produce
better solutions more rapidly than a process centralized within a single
firm or laboratory. There is also a populist reveling in the idea that
unsupported individuals can produce software of a commercial quality

91. See Geoffrey Lewis, Linus Torvalds Not Happy with Revised GPL,
EARTHTIMES.ORG, Jul. 31, 2006, http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/7882.html.
92. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
93. As Weber explains in detail, there is a great deal of organization of open source development. See Weber, supra note 3. My point, however, is that control and allocation of
resources is decentralized: Linus Torvalds has much less ability than Microsoft’s Chief
Software Architect to control precisely what Linux projects are handled with what level of
urgency and resources.
94. See, e.g., HENRY WILLIAM CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE
FOR CREATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (2003).
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that can compete with the output of the world’s largest corporations.95
To be sure, it is difficult to obtain empirical evidence about quality,
and the existing evidence seems ambiguous.96 The widespread adoption of commercially successful open source products offers strong
testimony that in some contexts the collaborative development model
can produce software of high quality and easy interoperability.
Aside from the quality of the software product, there remains the
key inquiry of how it can make sense for profit-seeking firms to invest
in open source projects if they will be unable to obtain a return on
their investment through control of the resulting software. In the proprietary model, property rights make it possible for a firm to internalize the benefits of R&D by prohibiting third parties from exploiting
the results of the research. It is not necessarily easy to make a profit,
but it is relatively easy to obtain revenues.
However, the importance of property rights to the proprietary
software industry can be overstated. Many firms do not exploit their
patents, and relatively few exploit their patents to collect licensing
revenues.97 One industry executive illustrated that point effectively
when he explained that in large patent-sophisticated firms in the software industry there is a ratio of about 15:85 between patents that are
licensed for revenues and those that are used defensively to maintain
freedom of action. The analogous ratio in the pharmaceutical industry,
he suggested, is about 75:25.98 To the extent that firms do collect licensing revenues,99 those revenues directly support the R&D that
helps the firm to maintain the quality and competitiveness of its technology. Still, the ability to prevent third parties from copying software
products is more robust in a model with property rights than it is in an
open source model in which the standard OSI requirements make it
impractical to exclude third parties from exploitation of technology
created in an open source community.
95. See generally A. Boulanger, Open-Source Versus Proprietary Software: Is One More
Reliable and Secure Than the Other?, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 239 (2005) (providing an interesting, though inconclusive, study of vulnerability and defect rates in open source and proprietary software).
96. See Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary
Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2004). Open source proponents can point, among other
things, to the low cost of their products (which are often available for free). At the same
time, advocates of proprietary software can point to studies suggesting that the total cost of
ownership, including training and maintenance charges, is higher for open source software.
My impression is that the studies as a group are ambiguous, suggesting that one type of
software might be cheaper in one context, but that broad general claims of superiority are
difficult to sustain.
97. See Mann, supra note 1.
98. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
99. IBM collects billions of dollars each year from the licensing of software-related patents. Mann, supra note 1, at 997. Other incumbent firms have been less successful in generating large revenue streams from those patents. For example, although Microsoft has begun
a similar program (also discussed in Mann, supra note 1, at 1006–07), it remains to be seen
whether this program will generate significant revenues.
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1. Predatory Motive: the “Kill Microsoft” Approach
In discussions about the economics of open source, one of the
most prominent ideas is that the model itself cannot be made profitable, but that firms invest in it solely because it decreases the monopoly power of Microsoft.100 In its simplest form, the idea is that firms
are willing to invest in software development that will not generate a
monetary return because of the likelihood that their efforts will lessen
the ability of Microsoft to extract future monopoly profits in markets
in which those firms might participate. A large customer like Intel
might want to preserve a competitor to Microsoft simply to minimize
the risks of being locked in to a single vendor.
Alternatively, perhaps the expectation is that profits will come
from a new market in which Microsoft is less powerful. For example,
if IBM thinks that it can respond to change and innovation more rapidly than competitors like Microsoft and Sun, then IBM should expect
to profit from any development that causes more rapid innovative
shifts in the industry.
This explanation is of great concern to Microsoft, where many
executives plainly believe that it has some element of truth.101 However, several software executives to whom I have spoken have emphasized that the most obvious victims of IBM’s Linux strategy, to the
extent that there have been victims, are UNIX competitors like Sun
Microsystems, not Microsoft.102 Sun directly competed with IBM in
the market for servers and the software that runs them. The rise of
Linux has destabilized Sun’s market position as a top-line purveyor of
servers and of a state-of-the-art flavor of UNIX (Solaris).103 Thus,
predatory-motive theory seems at best an incomplete story.
2. Traditional Profit Motive: the Value Chain Approach
Although there is surely some truth to it, the “kill Microsoft” explanation understates the extent to which investments in open source
projects are directly profitable — without regard to their effect on
Microsoft. Before suggesting that the investments are irrational, it is
important to understand how substantial they are. Executives have
100. Merges, supra note 3, at 192–93.
101. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
102. Id.
103. The competition between IBM and Sun is to some degree bound up in their differing
open source strategies. IBM was one of the earliest of the major proprietary companies to
develop a strong open source strategy. Sun’s interactions with the movement have been
much less harmonious, both because of its decision not to open source Java and because of
its willingness to reach a cross-licensing agreement with Microsoft that did not protect Open
Office. It remains to be seen whether its decision to open source Solaris in early 2004 will
be successful. See Raymond, supra note 34 (arguing that Sun’s license structures have
alienated open-source communities).
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estimated that the amount that proprietary companies currently spend
on the development of Linux is at least $1 billion a year, much of that
coming from a group of seven large proprietary companies that are
major investors in the OSDL: IBM, HP, Intel, Fujitsu, Red Hat,
104
Novell, and General Motors.
The most logical explanation for those investments comes from
the value chain concept. The idea is that a successful IT installation
necessarily will involve a variety of components, which can be characterized collectively as a value chain (or a software stack). Different
companies will have core competencies in different aspects of that
chain. One classic strategy is for a company to foster the commoditization of those portions of the stack in which the company does not
have a core competency, so that it can earn higher returns for those
portions of the stack in which it can compete.
To use the simplest example, Microsoft and Intel can be seen as
developing one successful value chain that involves the sale of highly
profitable products paired with the successful commoditization of the
personal computer that uses those products. The point is currently
easy to see, as the sale of IBM’s personal computer division to
Lenovo marks the departure of the firm that invented the market, and
Dell’s increasing market domination illustrates the success of its focus
on its core competency in logistics.
The only departure from the well-recognized strategy described
above is to use non-proprietary — “free” — products as part of the
value chain instead of commoditized products from other proprietary
companies. Conceptually, this is no different from a developer dedicating public streets in a subdivision to maximize the total value of
105
Just as all homeowners in an area can benefit
the development.

104. This surely understates the total amount of investment. As I have mentioned above,
there is some difficult-to-quantify amount of venture-backed investment. There also is a
considerable amount of informal investment from proprietary companies that permit their
employees to write open source code or sponsor important open source participants as employees (as when Torvalds worked for some time at Transmeta). MARTIN FINK, THE
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS OF LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE (2003). It also is common for
proprietary companies to spin off companies devoted wholly to open source. It is not yet
clear, however, how those activities relate to the venture investment activities of major
firms. As Benson and Ziedonis show, the investment models for those investments are quite
difficult to understand. See David Benson & Rosemarie Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In:
Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50
MGMT. SCI. 804 (2004). In this context, I expect that it is difficult to quantify the likelihood
that a firm would support an open source startup that itself might never be profitable, but
would increase demand for hardware, services, or infrastructure products sold by the sponsor. This surely explains why Intel Capital is the most prolific investor in the open sourcerelated startups I discuss above. It invested in fourteen of the sixty-six United States firms in
the
“Computer
Software”
sector.
See
VentureeXpert.com
Home
Page,
http://venturexpert.com.
105. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89
VA. L. REV. 1857, 1973–74 (2003) (exploring why an innovator might gain more profit
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from sharing a single public street that runs near all of their homes,
OSDL members benefit by sharing the costs of production of the
Linux operating system. One group of executives suggested that
maintaining a competitive enterprise software platform currently re106
If IBM can
quires about $500 million of investment each year.
spend $100 million per year on Linux and obtain access to such a platform, that is much cheaper than maintaining the platform on its
107
own.
Thus, investing in Linux is a rational step for the individual
members of the OSDL not because it might harm Microsoft or generate profits from direct sales, but because developing Linux as a highquality operating system permits each of them to develop complemen108
tary goods and services in their respective core competencies. From
this perspective, Linux is similar to other products that can be used as
platforms for third-party software. Other vendors may find this value
chain preferable to the competing Microsoft/Intel value chain because
in the former, the operating system cannot be used to extract profits.
Indeed, open source software is optimally suited for this type of arrangement. It is the ultimate commodity: anybody can distribute it at
no cost to the end user, promoting cooperation between market players and making it difficult for a single firm to develop a dominant position to undermine the OSDL strategy.
Moreover, when IBM and other members of the OSDL began investing in Linux, the operating system was already making inroads in
109
the server market. If those companies had resolutely stayed outside
that field, they would have risked a disruption in the market — a shift
from high-priced servers and proprietary operating systems to commoditized servers with free operating systems that could have driven
them from it completely, something that still may happen to Sun despite its efforts to participate in the open source community. The optimal response to that situation is to attempt to co-opt the potentially

from an innovation if it could foster related innovations through a gift to the public domain
of some portion of the innovation).
106. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
107. See Raymond, supra note 34 (discussing the benefits of cost-spreading).
108. Mahony & Naughton, supra note 4; Bruce Perens, The Emerging Economic Paradigm of Open Source, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.firstmonday.org/
issues/special10_10/perens/index.html. Economists that have examined the question have
concluded that in some circumstances the profits from applications built on an open source
platform can be greater than the profits from a set of proprietary applications and platform.
Nicholas Economides & Evangelos Katsamakas, Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs.
Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry, 52
MGMT. SCI. 1057, 1058 (2006).
109. See generally P.G. Capek et al., A History of IBM’s Open-Source Involvement and
Strategy, 44 IBM SYSTEMS J. 249 (2005) (presenting an official IBM account of its involvement and strategy).
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disruptive technology into the business model of the existing firm.
However, this does not stop the disruption. Rather, as suggested
above, it focuses the disruption on the firms least capable of integrating the new technology into their business models (namely Sun, if this
111
analysis turns out to be correct). Thus, investment in open source
has been successful as a disruptive strategy.
To use an obvious example, IBM is one of the most multi-faceted
firms in the IT industry. Even if IBM cannot profit from sales of the
Linux operating system and the Apache web server program, it can
profit by offering a value chain that uses those programs. First, it can
sell the servers that use those programs. Although IBM has come far
from the days when the sale of computer hardware was its only business, it retains major hardware lines in the areas where Linux is most
commonly used. Second, IBM can write proprietary software that can
be used on those computers. For example, after IBM failed to write its
own successful web server, it surrendered to the dominant Apache
program. It then developed its highly successful WebSphere program,
which is designed specifically to run on computers that use Apache.
Offering software designed for the large community of firms already
using Apache was key to gaining market adoption and a marked improvement on IBM’s earlier efforts to bundle similar products with its
own proprietary server programs. Third, IBM is an industry leader at
providing services that integrate various hardware and software prod112
ucts which is one of its most profitable enterprises.
Apple’s deployment of Mac OS X is another application of the
value chain approach. There, Apple has deployed a commoditized
base of software drawn from the OpenBSD flavor of UNIX, but
placed on top of it the sophisticated look and feel of a high quality
110. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN
NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997). Industry executives emphasized
that the rise of Linux does not fit the Christensen model perfectly, largely because Linux
entered the market as a high-quality flexible product, moving from the most demanding
users to the least demanding, rather than moving from the least demanding users to the most
demanding. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
111. The success of this strategy is particularly noteworthy given the general perception
among my interview subjects that Sun’s software technology — the Solaris operating system — is the most sophisticated of the Unix-based operating systems. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
112. My analysis is not undermined by the examples in Peter Swire’s cogent article on
the security market. See Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive
Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
1333, 1356 (2006) (discussing an earlier draft of this Article). Swire suggests that his interviews indicate that proprietary firms are profiting directly from investments in open-source
related areas and that my “value chain” analysis suggests that an undue level of indirectness
and complication is necessary for proprietary firms to profit in this area. Id. Studying his
examples, however, I have the impression that the disagreement is largely semantic. His
principal examples — firms that use proprietary code adjoined to open source code or firms
that sell services tailored to open source code — are precisely the type of business models
that I discuss here.
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graphical user interface, thereby focusing proprietary efforts on one of
Apple’s core competencies.
B. Open Source as a Market Correction
The most thoughtful assessment of the role of IP in the open
source context is Rob Merges’s A New Dynamism,113 which generally
portrays open source as a market correction responding to excessive
protection of IP. Merges views the investments that proprietary firms
make in open source projects as “property preempting investments”
(“PPI”) — or a form of “anti-property.” Those investments are designed to protect the commons from enclosure by IP rights held by
incumbents (of whom Microsoft is Merges’s principal concern). Although that perspective brings a healthy dose of economic analysis to
a subject that is often unduly romanticized,114 I believe that his perspective also is incomplete.
Merges argues that the balance between too many and too few
property rights can or will be solved essentially by making PPIs or
creating “anti-property” rights.115 To paraphrase his argument, the
investments are designed to make an “exclosure” — the opposite of
an enclosure — as a “property-free zone”116 into which later actors
cannot force their proprietary claims. That is not, however, a complete
answer. To be sure, developers write and contribute code to a community under broad licenses. For several reasons, however, that does
not have nearly so bucolic an effect as the casual reader of Merges’s
paper might assume.
The first reason is the simplest one: contributors to open source
projects for the most part do not convey their IP rights wholesale to
the open source community.117 Instead, contributors may retain own113. Merges, supra note 3.
114. See also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain,
92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004).
115. Merges, supra note 3.
116. Further, the rhetoric of a commons is inconsistent with the reliance on trademarks,
which are critically important to the open source model. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 23132; see also Ingrid Marson, Torvalds Weighs in on Linux Trademark Row, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 22, 2005, http://news.com.com/Torvalds+weighs+in+on+Linux+
trademark+row/2100-7344_3-5841222.html (discussing Linus Torvalds’s defense of the
vigorous action taken on his behalf to enforce the Linux tradename); Ingrid Marson, JBoss
Denies Running a Trademark Monopoly, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 11, 2005,
http://news.com.com/JBoss+denies+running+a+trademark+monopoly/
2100-7344_3-5893015.html (Marc Fleury’s response to critics of JBoss’s trademark enforcement policies). Trademarks have some of the same attributes as other forms of intangible property, such as the creation of network or bandwagon effects. Therefore, even if open
source did not depend on patent or copyright protections, a point that I debate in this Article,
it is still hard to say that property rights are not important in open source.
117. This is by no means universal. Many contributors do, in fact, convey their rights to
entities like the Free Software Foundation or the Apache Foundation, which for my purposes would seem to be trustees of the “exclosed” commons.
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ership of the IP rights in the code they create and merely license those
rights to the open source community. In the case of Linux, hundreds
of contributors own copyright interests in their contributed code and
thereby can prevent Linux from adopting the new version of the GPL.
Since Linux is the largest open source project released under the GPL,
those contributors in fact retain some ability to hinder reversioning of
the GPL.118 The possibility of conflict is real: the analogous reversioning problem for the MPL is at least partially responsible for the birth
of Firefox as a substantially new program free from the strictures of
the original MPL.
A disagreement over the direction a project should take will ultimately be resolved in favor of the person who controls the relevant IP
(whether it be copyrights in the source code, control of the trade
name, or ownership of important patents).119 Similarly, reversioning
of the GPL would be easier if every Linux contributor would agree to
anything the Free Software Foundation and OSDL submit as an appropriate update of the GPL.120 But in the end, if there is a dispute
over either of those issues, the person with control of the IP will have
the final word: it is Torvalds’s control of much of the core IP in Linux
that gives him so much negotiating power in the struggle to update the
GPL.
Additionally, consider the case of dual-licensing firms like
MySQL, where the firm that employs a project’s contributors holds
substantially all of the IP rights to that project. This dual-licensing
structure allows the firm to use a conventional proprietary licensing
model to profit from a version of the software that might not differ
from the version available under an open source license.
The second reason why an “exclosure” may not create a fully
property-free zone relates to the terms of the open source projects’
licenses. As discussed above, it is quite plain, particularly in the area
of the modern commercial licenses (MPL, Apple, and Sun licenses,
etc.), that licenses are consciously being drafted with considerable
technical care to limit the nature of the patent rights a contributor licenses to an open source community.121 The modern licenses generally do not offer a broad grant of all IP rights necessary to permit
development of the project to which the contribution has been made.
118. For discussion of the reversioning effort, see Welcome to GPLv3,
http://gplv3.fsf.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2006) .
119. See, e.g., Stephen Shankland, Open-Source Mambo Project Faces Rift, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 22, 2005, http://news.com.com/Open-source+Mambo+project+faces+rift/
2100-7344_3-5841347.html (discussing dispute among contributors to Mambo).
120. The possibility of conflict is becoming more serious, as Linus Torvalds has announced his dissatisfaction with the early drafts of GPLv3.0. See Lewis, supra note 91.
121. Because the GPL includes no explicit patent license from its contributors, it is
harder to be precise in making this point about the GPL. I take it as plain, however, that the
implied license conveyed by a GPL contribution would be similarly incomplete. See ROSEN,
supra note 3, at 126.
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Rather, they are limited to existing patents, to patents that apply to the
project in its current stage, or the like.
The third reason is a simple matter of patent doctrine. Even when
contributors have used licenses or contribution agreements that transfer all of their IP interests, they cannot logically create a property-free
“exclosure,” because of the possibility that the resulting software
product will infringe patent rights held by noncontributors. Open
source releases might amount to a sufficiently public use of the code
to constitute prior art, thus preventing others from obtaining subsequent patent rights. They would not, however, prevent the assertion of
patent rights by persons who had made similar undisclosed inventions
before the creation of the open source prior art.
Perhaps the most effective way, albeit an imperfect and costly
one, to ensure a zone free of third-party property rights is for the
software developer to create its own patent rights to cover the space.
For example, Sun claims that it owns all of the patents necessary for
the deployment of Solaris.122 Early and aggressive patenting can make
it difficult for independent designers to obtain patents directed to their
products. Even there, the possibility of bombshell patents is real in
light of the high pace of innovation, where foundational patents could
easily issue in 2005 for technology first invented in 2001. Many, if
not all, of the large firms in this area continue to collect patents. Although several of those firms have made statements about their plans
to enforce certain patents against potential infringers, none of them
has made a binding commitment to forgo their enforcement rights
entirely. To the contrary, patent rights are maintained as part of the
elaborate equilibrium of cross-licensing arrangements.
In 2005, several major players such as IBM, Sun, and Nokia issued pledges not to enforce their patents.123 Those statements, however, did not contribute the patents to a commons, much less to a
property-free public domain. For example, IBM’s pledge was made to
developers of open source products and not to the public at large.124
122. This claim seems most implausible, although it has been made quite publicly. See
Sun Grants Global Open Source Community Access to More than 1,600 Patents,
http://www.sun.com/smi/Press/sunflash/2005-01/sunflash.20050125.2.xml (last visited
November 8, 2006).
123. In the case of IBM, the contribution followed a statement that IBM does not intend
to assert its patent portfolio against the Linux kernel, unless IBM is forced to defend itself.
That statement broadly covers the entire portfolio, but is unlikely to create reliably enforceable obligations on the part of IBM as circumstances change in the ever-developing landscape of the industry.
124. IBM’s pledge applies “to any individual, community, or company working on or using software that meets the Open Source Initiative (OSI) definition of open source software
now or in the future.” IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS,
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
The patents cover a broad range of technologies. However, some have criticized the scope
of the pledge because many of the patents are thought to be of little use to the open source
community. A cursory review of the list reveals that 397 of the 500 patents are in primary
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Further, the underlying technology is not available for the development of proprietary offerings by competing products or services firms
(such as Microsoft and Apple, both of which have used UNIX technology in their operating systems). Nor is the grant absolute, because
it is not effective against a firm that asserts patent claims against IBM.
Similarly, Sun’s pledge is limited to patents used in Solaris,125 so it
does little more than the grant of patent rights that would be included
in a license to use Solaris.126 Responding to a barrage of criticism regarding the limited significance of that pledge, Sun has announced
that despite the absence of a “fancy pledge” on its website, it has “no
intention of suing open source developers.”127 Still, it is not clear that
Sun will not enforce its patent portfolio to challenge Linux as a competitor to Solaris. To the extent that Sun’s program rests on the desire
to create a Solaris-based value chain that would facilitate the sale of
hardware, an attack to destabilize the Linux-based value chain might
be a plausible response. The narrowness of the pledges is made even
clearer by the praise Nokia garnered for the modest step of extending
its pledge not only to the existing versions of Linux but also to future
ones.128
I do not mean to understate the commitment of those firms to the
development of collaborative research in those areas. My point is a
more fundamental one: it is not constructive to think of these investments as creating a truly open domain, or in Merges’s terms, a “property preempting investment.”
Still, there is little doubt that open source strategies are deterring
others from enforcing their patent rights in some contexts. These
strategies are similar to, but potentially more powerful than, the creation of large patent portfolios within individual firms. Using combined patent portfolios to create fences around some open source
IPC G06F (the code typically associated with software). Some of the patents are quite dated:
199 were issued in 2001; 232 were issued in 1997; and 69 were issued in 1993. Id.
125. Sun’s pledge purports to give free access to patents “under the Common Development and Distribution License (CDDL).” See Sun Grants Global Open Source Community
Access to More than 1,600 Patents, supra note 122.
126. Common Development and Distribution License, supra note 73, § 2.1(b). As discussed above, provisions to that effect are ubiquitous in modern open source licenses.
127. Stephen Shankland, Sun: Patent Use OK Beyond Solaris Project, CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 31, 2005, http://news.com.com/Sun+Patent+use+OK+beyond+
Solaris+project/2100-7344_3-5557658.html.
128. See, e.g., Jim Wagner, Nokia’s Linux Pledge, DEVELOPER, May 26, 2005,
http://www.internetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3508146. For an additional anecdote
about Computer Associates, compare the laudatory press release discussing the pledge by
Computer Associates, Chris Preimesberger, CA Patents Made Available to Open-Source
Community,
EWEEK,
Sept.
7,
2005,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/
0,1895,1856420,00.asp (a press release lauding Computer Associates’ pledge) with Matt
Whipp, Computer Associates’ Patent Donation Is Slammed, PC PRO, Sept. 13, 2005,
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/77337/computer-associates-patent-donation-is-slammed.html
(criticizing Computer Associates’ pledge on the grounds that the covered patents were
worthless or irrelevant to the open source community).
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technologies, the large firms are shifting the equilibrium to send a
clear message: “We mean to protect these technologies as much as —
if not more than — we protect our own proprietary products. Although we may not use our patent rights offensively, we will use them
to defend our proprietary products and the open source technologies
that we support.”129

IV. THE EFFECT OF COMMERCIALIZED OPEN SOURCE
A. Effect on Industry Organization and Innovation
If the ultimate effect of the “property-preempting investments”
described above is a shift in the enforcement equilibrium to bring
open source programs under the shelter of some of the existing largefirm portfolios, then it is hard to accept the open source phenomenon
as fundamentally weakening the IP system. That is not to say, however, that the rise of open source will not affect innovation in the industry. Recent literature on the relation between IP and industrial
130
for expecting that
organization provides a strong theoretical basis
the prevailing open source business models will have consequences
131
on the location of innovation. As Tim Wu explains, there is good
reason to think that this kind of effect — an effect on the “decision
architecture” of an industry — will often be a more important effect
on intellectual property rights than a direct effect on competition
132
caused by exploitation of the right to exclude.
I start with the theory articulated by Ashish Arora and his coauthors that a stronger IP system often leads to smaller and more spe129. Several of the major Linux backers have formalized this strategy with the formation
of the Open Invention Network. Press reports suggest this entity will provide royalty-free
licenses to parties that agree not to assert patent rights against Linux users that have signed
similar agreements. Linux Backers Form Patent-Sharing Firm, ZDNET, Dec. 10, 2005,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5943781.html. If the licenses gain broad acceptance,
this could lead to a shared equilibrium for the patents held by those entities. As of October
2006, however, the web site for Open Invention Network indicated that it had acquired only
thirteen patents. Open Invention Network, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/
pat_owned.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
130. See Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1215 (2005) (reporting empirical evidence
that stronger IP systems influence the direction of innovation). The recent history of the
software industry, which has seen a great deal of innovation as software patents have become easier to obtain, illustrates this contention.
131. It is difficult to quantify the effect of stronger or weaker intellectual property systems on levels of innovation. As I explain in Mann, supra note 1, we can say that the levels
of innovation in the software industry seem quite high, with R&D intensities greater than in
most other industries during the last decade. My point here is simply that the rise of open
source is likely to affect the location and dispersion of that innovation.
132. Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VA. L.
REV. 123 (2006).
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133

cialized firms. They reason that strong IP rights generally encourage investment in specialized firms with a superior ability to innovate,
largely because strong IP rights limit the costs of leakage that occur
134
when the locus of innovation is beyond a firm’s boundaries. Conversely, a weaker IP system makes it more difficult to protect proprietary technology and thus prompts the creation of larger firms and
135
industry consolidation. The effect is particularly salient with technologically intensive inputs, and leads to investments in smaller specialized firms over vertically integrated firms. Research in the
chemical industry and the semiconductor industry provides empirical
136
support for that possibility.
The theory that Arora and his coauthors have articulated has obvious applications to the software industry. There, innovation is cumulative because many firms are attempting to build new products
that use the same set of cutting-edge ideas. Thus, a fragmented structure can provide multiple opportunities for solutions to difficult technological problems. This is surely part of the explanation for evidence
suggesting that small firms can be more innovative than large firms.
It is also the case that use of property rights to codify output from
research and development makes it much easier for firms of differing
sizes and research emphases to settle into a cross-licensing equilibrium. Without some form of protection, it would be difficult to force
participants in the industry to contribute to agreements with their various cross-licensing partners, or to exclude from the equilibrium firms
that do not contribute their share of innovation.
As property rights were strengthened in the mid-1990s, the software industry became increasingly fragmented. It is therefore possible
that fragmentation has supported a higher rate of innovation than otherwise would have existed. The natural question, then, is whether
open source will alter the existing structure. There are good reasons to
think — as paradoxical as it might seem — that the rise of open
137
source will support industry consolidation, not fragmentation. This
133. Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and
Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293 (2006); Ashish Arora &
Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004).
134. See Arora & Ceccagnoli, supra note 133; Arora & Merges, supra note 133.
135. See Arora & Ceccagnoli, supra note 133; Arora & Merges, supra note 133.
136. See Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in Chemicals, 26 RES.
POL’Y 391 (1997); see also Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–
1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001); Benson & Ziedonis, supra note 104.
137. Although it is more difficult to quantify effects on the level of innovation, the rise of
open source could have effects there as well. My sense is that corporate participation in the
movement reflects the fact that the industry has matured to the point that the level of innovation has caught up or is catching up to the needs of users. If innovation is viewed as the
commercialization of basic research (perhaps, here, the Internet), then there would be a
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is true because the business models that are most likely to succeed in
connection with open source development are business models that
work better for larger firms.
A fundamental distinction between open source and proprietary
software is the ambiguity of the sponsor of the program. For proprietary software products, a specific company typically owns, develops,
maintains, and supports the program. The purchase of a proprietary
software product is, for the most part, a bet that a specific and plainly
identifiable company will stand behind the product in a number of
important ways. For instance, one may expect that the developer will
repair flaws in the product promptly; that it will upgrade the product
to account for new technological developments; and (most importantly for my analysis) that it will protect users from claims that use of
138
the product infringes the IP rights of third parties.
It may be that proprietary software developers do not often incur
ironclad contractual obligations on all of those points. But despite
what their contracts might say, they certainly have considerable residual legal responsibility for those problems. In the reputational marketplace in which software vendors compete for customers, there is a
powerful motivation for a software developer to accept responsibility
for serious problems related to its software, without regard to the details of its anticipated legal responsibility for those problems.
In contrast, the situation is considerably more complex for open
source software. For one thing, the licenses that govern open source
software differ from the licenses that govern proprietary software in
that open source authors are likely to categorically disclaim responsi139
bility for the kinds of problems discussed above. That makes some
sense given the nature of the software’s development, where specific
contributions are made by individuals who cannot expect to use profits from the sale of the software to defray anticipated liabilities that
might arise from its distribution and use. Moreover, even the proprietary companies that operate in the open source community almost
uniformly disclaim any legal responsibility for problems with the
140
software.
period of rapid fragmentation and innovation until the number of possible ways to commercialize the technologies begins to stabilize. That period would be followed by a reconsolidation of firms, a lessening of the pace of innovation, and a focus on the efficient delivery of
well-defined products and services. At that point, we might expect major breakthroughs to
come from academia, governments and R&D divisions of large firms until some new “transformative need” is identified.
138. Unlike copyright law, which does not control “use” of a copyright work, a patent
controls any use of the patented technology. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
139. See, e.g., Apache License, supra note 74, §§ 7–8; The Regents of the University of
California,
The
4.4BSD
Copyright ¶
2
(1994),
http://www.freebsd.org/
copyright/license.html; CDDL, supra note 73, § 5; GPL, supra note 65; MPL, supra note
72, § 9.
140. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
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That means that the motivation behind any response to users’
problems with open source software is likely to come from a reputational incentive rather than an enforceable legal obligation. It is, of
course, much more difficult for a business to assess the reliability of a
reputational incentive than that of a legal obligation. Yet it cannot be
rational for a business to adopt an open source software platform
without satisfying itself that somebody will maintain, upgrade, and
defend the software.
A large and publicly visible firm will be more responsive to reputational incentives than a small and emerging firm, for obvious reasons. It is no accident that open source’s commercial success has risen
rapidly since IBM’s public embrace of Apache and Linux at the beginning of this decade. Even a relatively small, publicly-traded firm
like Pervasive would have an advantage in finding customers for an
open source database project over smaller startup firms purveying
similar products, such as Green Plum. Detractors of open source software often argue that it is risky for a business to rely on reputational
considerations for important software purchases. I have no occasion to
assess the plausibility of that argument. My point here is simply that a
rational business would find it much easier to overcome that concern
when open source software is closely associated with a large and publicly visible firm than when the software is associated with a smaller
or younger firm.
The second point relates to the distinction between products and
services firms. As discussed above, the open source model leans ineluctably toward services firms, particularly when the underlying open
source project is governed by the GPL.141 This is, of course, a generalization — there are open source products firms (like MontaVista
and the startups discussed above) and important proprietary services
firms (like EDS). But the constraints of the business model do press
open source firms toward the services end of the spectrum more forcefully than they do proprietary firms.
To the extent that this theory is true, the open source model
should in turn support larger firms because larger firms have a comparative advantage in the service sectors of the software industry. A
few overlapping reasons give rise to this comparative advantage. First,
the venture capital startup model works much better for products
142
firms than it does for services firms, so there will be relatively few
143
In particular, there is good reason to think
startup services firms.
that the property rights granted by patents will be uniquely valuable to
141. See supra text accompanying note 133.
142. CUSUMANO, supra note 8.
143. Mann, supra note 1, at 976 n.80; see Mann & Sager, supra note 1, at 26 (“[T]he
great majority of venture-backed software firms are closer to the product end of the product/service continuum.”).
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firms attempting to progress successfully through the venture capital
144
cycle.
The comparative advantage continues throughout the business cycle. Just as the product model is better suited to the venture-backed
financing common for startups, large established firms will have an
advantage in the service sector. First, large, established firms are simply going to be better at the integrative services model epitomized by
IBM. The “not flashy, just fully informed” business is nearly always
going to be the large established firm, not the destructive innovator.
Second, as I heard repeatedly in interviews, there are considerable
economies of scale in providing the kind of 24/7 quick-response service that large corporations expect from their software providers. It is
much harder for a startup with three customers to support infrastructure than a larger company with dozens (or hundreds) of customers.
Red Hat is perhaps the best example of this. After raising $13
million from venture capitalists and strategic investors in 1998 and
145
early 1999, Red Hat raised $84 million in an August 1999 IPO.
However, even Red Hat was unable to achieve profitability using a
traditional services model coupled with a pure open source product.
Red Hat never turned a profit until its decision in 2002 to split its
product line between the slow-changing Red Hat Enterprise Linux
(“RHEL”) — which comes with certifications, long-term guarantees
for support and bug fixes, and a mandatory per-computer price tag —
and the fast-changing Fedora, which is free, uncertified, relatively
unsupported, and packed with the latest upgrades. Red Hat was profit146
able for the first time in 2004, presumably due to selling subscrip147
tions to RHEL.

144. Mann, supra note 1, at 976; see Mann & Sager, supra note 1, at 28 (“[T]here are
strongly significant correlations between variables of patenting . . . and various proxies for
strong performance . . . .”); see also John R. Allison et al., Patents and Business Models for
Software Firms (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 77,
2006),
available
at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/rmann/info/Data/
PatentsandBusinessModelsPaper.pdf (presenting empirical evidence that products firms
more commonly use patents than services firms).
145. See Dwight Johnson, Venture Capital Invested in Red Hat, LINUX J., Dec. 1, 1998,
http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/3171; Stephen Shankland, Red Hat Shares Triple in
IPO, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 11, 1999, http://news.com.com/2100-1001-229679.html.
146. RED HAT, INC., FORM 10-K, at 18 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1087423/000119312505108884/d10k.htm (reporting a profit for Red Hat in
2004, but losses in 2003 and before).
147. Subscription sales carry high profit margins in the range of eighty to ninety percent.
Services sales carry much lower margins, in the range of forty to fifty percent. In addition,
although services revenues have remained relatively flat, subscription revenues skyrocketed
in 2004 when Red Hat sold approximately 169,500 subscriptions to RHEL products, compared to 36,500 in the previous year. Novell seems to be entering a similar phase, with much
higher margins on software licenses than on services (ninety percent versus fifty percent in
2002), but steeper declines in licensing sales. It remains to be seen whether Novell’s accelerating shift to a Linux platform can stem the decline. See REDHAT, INC., 2004 ANNUAL
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More generally, a property rights system favors new entrants because large firms can use other tools related to their market power to
continue to grow (e.g., leveraging products against other products,
leveraging services against products, marketing advantages). Small
148
firms have nowhere to turn except property rights. It is easier for a
small startup to pursue an idea to the point of having a solid patent or
set of patents sufficient to protect the idea from competitors than to
develop the kind of brand identification and market power that would
149
allow it to compete against large incumbents. In substance, as Figure 1 suggests, this is a basic distinction in the types of appropriation
mechanisms that are useful for different types of firms.
Figure 1: Appropriation Mechanisms
SMALLER FIRMS

LARGER FIRMS

First-Mover Advantage
Patents

Market Power
Brand Identification
Leveraging Value Chains

From this perspective, open source, in the sectors where it succeeds, removes from the market firms that are developing discrete
150
So open source,
products from which they wish to get revenues.
viewed more fully, is highly interconnected to proprietary property
rights, and it potentially could support a substantial shift in the distribution of innovation in the industry. Thus, open source, and not patents, potentially poses the largest threat to the “polyarchic” decision
structure, that is, the multiplicity of small software firms under which
151
the software industry has flourished for the last decade.
The legal dispute over Linux plainly has the potential to disrupt
152
Open
the distribution of Linux-related products and services.
REPORT (2005), available at http://investors.redhat.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=67156&p=irolreportsannual.
148. See supra text accompanying note 133.
149. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
150. On the other hand, there are also reasons why open source aids small, proprietary
startup firms. Open source software can be a useful input for these firms by decreasing the
costs of completing a marketable product and helping firms focus their development expenditures on the portions of their products that are uniquely differentiating. Those firms, of
course, depend directly on the property rights in the products.
151. See generally Wu, supra note 132, at 126 (discussing the distinction between hierarchical and polyarchical systems).
152. SCO’s lawsuit contends that IBM obtained information concerning the UNIX source
code and derivative works from SCO and inappropriately used and distributed that information in connection with its efforts to promote Linux. IBM has responded vigorously, claiming that SCO does not have the right to assert claims based on UNIX ownership, that SCO
has breached the GPL, and that SCO has infringed certain patents owned by IBM. Although
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source still has many unanswered questions: What happens if one of
the many individual contributors to an open source program provides
even a few lines of code that contain the trade secrets of another firm?
Or that infringe another firm’s copyright or patent? Would removal of
the infringing lines be an adequate response? Or would a court enjoin
distribution of the entire program? Or require the payment of substantial damages by any and all of the many users of the program?
Thus, the industry is at a turning point. The rapid growth of property rights in the industry over the last decade has had a relatively benign effect so far, largely because of the relatively stable proprietary
153
equilibrium that has prevailed until now. But can the open source
business models discussed above grow to maturity without collapsing
that equilibrium? Will one method of development or the other prevail
so completely as to dominate the industry?
Some of those questions are directly at issue in the SCO litigation. Others are implicit. For example, the case directly raises the pos154
Does it
sibility that a court might hold the GPL unenforceable.
155
create a binding contract? Will it be enforced as written? Will anyone who distributes open source software forever be barred from enforcing property rights? Will large patentees such as IBM use their
patents to protect just Linux or will those protections extend to other
open source programs? The way the industry is responding to those
unsettled questions is fascinating; the answers will likely reveal the
direction of the industry in the years to come.
Another important question concerns the significance of the various open source development communities. If large firms take over
much of open source software, what will happen to those communities? Richard Epstein, for example, pointedly questions whether loose
networks of affiliated firms can survive without the corporate govern156
His article raises
ance structures that support single-firm models.
two related points.
First, in the current environment, there is some reason to be concerned about the stability of the existing licenses, and in particular, the
early news reports predicted that the lawsuit would harm Linux, others have now claimed
that the suit actually has helped Linux by accelerating its popularity and legal foundation.
Stuart Cohen, How SCO’s Threats Rallied Linux, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 7, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2005/tc2005027_4780.htm. For a
discussion of the murky history of IP rights in UNIX as resolved in the AT&T/Berkeley
litigation, see WEBER, supra note 3, at 49–52.
153. See Mann, supra note 1, at 990–92.
154. Cf. Landgericht [LG] München [District Court of Munich] May 19, 2004, No. 21 O
6123/04 (F.R.G.), http://www.jbb.de/urteil_lg_muenchen_gpl.pdf (holding GPL enforceable), translated in http://www.jbb.de/judgment_dc_munich_gpl.pdf.
155. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 65–66 (arguing that the GPL is not a contract because it
lacks the requisite elements, and that the GPL is best treated as a license).
156. Richard A. Epstein, Why Open Source Is Unsustainable, FT ONLINE, Oct. 21, 2004,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/78d9812a-2386-11d9-aee5-00000e2511c8.html.
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stability of communities built on reciprocal licenses like the GPL.
As discussed above, reciprocal licenses like the GPL impose greater
restrictions on the ability of proprietary firms to integrate their products with open source code than academic licenses or many of the
158
The interviews I
more recently developed commercial licenses.
conducted suggest that sophisticated developers can use techniques to
write programs that are adequately functional and yet technically
separated from the Linux kernel as necessary to avoid “infection” by
159
the GPL license. What is not clear, however, is how much effort is
required for engineers of less than complete sophistication to invent or
master those techniques. The interviews leave me with the strong impression that this is a serious problem for all but the most elite organizations. This suggests a minor point of some irony — increasing use
of the GPL might give larger companies a relative advantage in working on the fringes of GPL projects.
Second, the type of license will likely have some effect on the
type of software firm that can effectively use the project. For example,
it is widely recognized that a more lenient license permits more third160
Previous scholars have not focused, however,
party development.
on the likely effects that differing licenses have on third-party development. A strong reciprocal license (like the GPL) does not impede a
services firm, which should be relatively agnostic about the commodi161
Indeed, services
tization of the software that its customers buy.
firms should prefer Linux, given that, without formal support structures of its own, Linux leaves the area of customer support services
open to third-party firms. Thus, for example, firms like Linuxcare,
Turbolinux, and Red Hat have developed business models for selling
consulting and services related to Linux software. VA Linux, like
IBM, sells both consulting services and servers.
In contrast to services firms, it is much easier for a products firm
to operate in an environment with a less restrictive license, such as
Apache or BSD. Thus, small firms like Covalent and Gluecode develop proprietary software that is designed to operate with Apache
software. Some of the most highly visible and successful proprietary
software products have been built on top of code covered by such licenses. The most prominent example, of course, is IBM’s WebSphere
157. A substantial part of the concern regarding the GPL relates not to its individual substantive terms but rather to its overall ambiguity. E.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, DeBugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 83–92 (2002) (noting
several such ambiguities). Whether that can be solved by reversioning is yet another difficult question for the communities that rely on that license.
158. See supra text accompanying note 65.
159. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
160. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 3, at 181 (explaining the various licenses and their potential implications).
161. See CUSUMANO, supra note 8.
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program, discussed above, which is built on and interacts directly with
the Apache HTTP Server. In addition, Apple’s widely acclaimed new
operating system Mac OS X rests on top of a BSD-licensed operating
system (FreeBSD 3.2). Apple has layered its popular graphical user
interface (“GUI”) onto the UNIX-style open source operating system.
Executives whom I interviewed pointed to this as one of the most perceptive executions of a core competency strategy: Apple maintains
control of the GUI that gives its products so much verve in the marketplace, but takes advantage of the commoditized operating system
available from the open source community.
As the commercialization of the open source model proceeds, the
pressure placed on the GPL will necessarily increase. If it turns out
that it is important in the marketplace for there to be proprietary products more closely related to the Linux kernel than the GPL permits,
the open source movement will confront a contracting crisis in which
the software must suffer in functionality unless the GPL can be revised to accommodate these concerns. However, as Epstein notes, the
lack of a single control point in the decentralized open source development model makes a substantial shift in direction more difficult
162
than it is for a proprietary firm. The open source community is apparently aware of the problem, as it enters a period of reversioning of
the GPL that would cover subsequent distributions of Linux and other
163
To date, however, there is little reason for
open source software.
optimism that the Free Software Foundation will promulgate a revised
version of the GPL that responds to those concerns. Mozilla was un164
able to pass through reversioning successfully. Thus, the important
question for open source communities is whether they can develop the
institutional structures to modify the contracts successfully or whether
they will be forced to start over periodically (as Firefox has done for
the most part in the browser market)? Long-term commercial success
probably depends on the ability of the proponents of Linux to persuade content developers that they will not need to start over simply
to resolve licensing problems.
Beyond those short term problems lurk longer-term problems.
Academics have long pondered the motivations behind the large-scale
voluntary efforts of open source contributors to develop commercially
165
valuable software. A sophisticated literature offers a variety of rea166
sons why individuals might make such contributions. As commer162. See Epstein, supra note 156.
163. See generally supra note 118 and accompanying text.
164. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
165. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 46, at 411 n.83 (observing that “incentive-based contracts . . . may undermine voluntary cooperation”).
166. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003).
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cialization proceeds, however, firms will more frequently justify their
contributions by reference to the kinds of value chain motivations
167
There is a risk that long-term shifts in market
discussed above.
structure will cause such individuals’ motivations to dissipate. For
example, it makes sense in current conditions for all of the various
players in the OSDL group to make substantial contributions of personnel, technology, and resources to Linux development. However, as
the market shifts and different firms gain dominance, there always is
the possibility that the community capable of profiting from Linuxrelated products may contract (just as it might grow). For example,
Dell recently withdrew from OSDL, apparently concluding that the
markets in which it could exploit its core capabilities were not suffi168
ciently related to Linux products to justify continued contributions.
This is a classic free-rider problem: if some of the contributors are
profiting from value chain investments in Linux and others are not,
those who are not profiting may withdraw from the process or diminish their contributions. Once that process begins, it might rapidly
reach a tipping point where commercial contributions became limited
to a relatively small number of firms.
Another cause for concern is the continuing efforts of firms to use
the contracts that organize their communities to design novel and specialized types of communities, just as the real estate developer uses
covenants and restrictions to erect a particular set of property rights
tailor-made to a particular subdivision. Existing practices suggest a
spectrum ranging from complete enclosure in a single firm to open
access for all.169
The first step along this spectrum is the proprietary development
system. This is best exemplified by Apple’s personal computers,
which traditionally have used an operating system with a completely
proprietary interface that allows Apple to control not only the basic
products, but also the applications and utilities that interact with those
products. That model has allowed Apple to develop products that
many users regard as the ultimate in functionality and ease of integration, though it has caused drawbacks by limiting the size of the development community that produces third-party applications for those
170
products.
The second step is proprietary development with an open interface. Microsoft’s products typically have joined closely guarded proprietary code with relatively easy access to interfaces, allowing third
167. See supra text accompanying notes 92–99.
168. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
169. Cf. Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181, 181–89 (2003) (observing a fundamental disagreement over conceptions of property).
170. Lichtman, supra note 30, at 616.
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parties to develop compatible products. That model has given Microsoft strong market power in the market for operating systems and office applications for desktop computers, both because of Microsoft’s
enormous investments in continuing development of its software and
because of the substantial community of third-party developers,
whose products have extended the functionality of Microsoft’s software.171
A third step is a gated community. A good example from my interviews appears in the context of semiconductor development. In that
industry, there are two substantial competing camps of research and
development. Intel leads one of them. The other is a consortium of
researchers from IBM, Advanced Micro Devices, and others. All
members of the consortium contribute funds and personnel, and gain
access to a pooled set of IP, but the IP is not available to nonmembers
(which is to say, Intel). Industry executives praised the success of this
development model, which has produced technology commensurate
with Intel’s technology at a much lower cost. Although this type of
community is formally proprietary, the practical result is quite similar
to the modern commercial open source community. As discussed
above, the patent licenses typically offered by open source contributors are carefully restricted as to limit the freedom of outsiders to use
the technology or take it in directions contrary to the wishes of the
sponsors and major contributors.
The final step on the spectrum is the wholly open community,
characterized (at least in theory) by the Linux community governed
172
by the GPL. The business case for this community is one of openly
collaborative development. As suggested above, these collaborative
models offer benefits from both the cost savings and the technological
173
gains of collaborative rather than one-shop development.
Major market players are constantly developing new consortia,
reflecting different structures for investment in and access to technology tailored to different user markets. At the simplest level, development at the proprietary end of the spectrum is more suited for
products aimed at individuals, such as desktop applications, where
ease of installation and network effects are critical to market penetration. On the opposite end, wholly open solutions often are attractive
for applications targeted at sophisticated users in enterprise settings
where factors like total cost of ownership and specialized integration
with other systems are more important than ease of installation. As
171. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
172. Given the implied nature of the GPL patent license, there is a great deal of doubt as
to exactly how free users are to take and modify Linux. In practice, however, contributors
with patent rights are unlikely to enforce them against users or modifiers of Linux. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
173. CHESBROUGH, supra note 94, at 49–51; see supra text accompanying note 94.
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those structures become increasingly specialized and numerous, will
their informality be able to survive? As the discussion above suggests,
any number of events could destabilize those communities, such as a
tipping toward the technology of a particular partner or an incendiary
assertion of property rights by somebody outside the community.
B. Effect on Intellectual Property Rights
The most pointed question is the importance of property rights in
the years to come. There are some contractual efforts to limit the importance of those claims. For example, firms like Microsoft and HP
have begun to indemnify their users from potential infringement
175
claims.174 Others have begun to offer insurance policies. Similarly,
one of the distinguishing features of the subscription models for open
source products is contractual protection of customers from IP claims
176
related to the open source product. As discussed above, still others
are promising not to enforce existing property rights or (at least implicitly) promising to enforce existing property rights against those
who threaten the movement.
Still, most agree that it is necessary to acquire more patents to
remain competitive in the industry. The major corporate members of
the OSDL continue to make heavy investments in patented technology: IBM, HP, and Intel have each been obtaining more than one
thousand patents per year. Similarly, pure open source firms increasingly are acquiring their own patents, primarily to protect themselves
from the threat of litigation.177 There may have been a time when the
open source community was dominated by a political motivation not
to obtain software patents, but that time is fading rapidly into the past.
In addition, it is worth noting that most software patents are issued to
firms outside the industry. There is no reason to think that an increase — or decrease — in collaborative development in the software
174. Microsoft offers broad protection against infringement claims based on its products.
Stacey Higginbotham, How Open? That’s the Big Patent Question, DEAL.COM, Sept. 25,
2005, http://news.com.com/2100-1014_3-5877028.html. HP’s indemnification plan protects
against SCO attacks. Similarly, Red Hat offers a warranty to replace any infringing code.
Novell offers legal indemnification against copyright infringement claims brought against
Linux server software customers. Stephen Shankland, Novell Offers Legal Protection for
Linux, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 13, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-7344_3-5139632.html.
175. This is the business model of Open Source Risk Management, for whom Lloyd’s of
London underwrites insurance against claims of copyright or patent infringement through
the use of Linux. R.J. Kiln & Co., Ltd., Open Source Compliance Representation and Warranty
Insurance
(2006),
http://www.osriskmanagement.com/
KilnOpenSourceComplianceInsurance.pdf.
176. Examples here from my interviews would be firms like MySQL, Pervasive, and Red
Hat.
177. See, e.g., Joe Brockmeier, Red Hat Acquiring Netscape Enterprise Solutions Software, LWN.NET, Oct. 6, 2004, http://lwn.net/Articles/104412/.
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industry will have a substantial effect on the propensity of firms outside the industry to obtain patents.
More fundamentally, it is not clear that corporate participants like
the OSDL would contribute to open source development without the
internalization of research and development benefits that patents facilitate. If much of the participation of proprietary firms in open
source development is motivated by “value chain” returns, then patents presumably will be just as important, if not more so, in the remaining core areas in which those firms are attempting to differentiate
themselves. Thus, IBM’s willingness to refrain from enforcing some
of its patents against open source developers does not carry with it a
willingness to forgo the use of other patents to protect its proprietary
products like WebSphere that build on open source projects. It may be
that patents are less useful for the services portion of IBM’s business
than they are for its products or hardware sectors, but there is little
reason to believe that any of those lines of activity would benefit from
the removal of patent protection. Nor has Sun granted free access to
its portfolio — it has granted only the patent rights necessary for the
use of the specific program that it has contributed to the open source
community.
The core issue is the significance of the threat of patent infringement litigation. A prominent, though self-interested, study by Open
Source Risk Management (“OSRM”), for example, concluded that the
Linux kernel infringes 283 currently issued patents.178 One highly
informed executive suggested that there are about two hundred crucial
patents, access to which is necessary to distribute a modern operating
system.179 Although that estimate seems quite high, even a much
lower estimate would suggest a serious potential for infringement by
open source programs that do not have access to patented technology.
The mere threat has had numerous effects, ranging from the contractual assurances discussed above to some difficult-to-gauge disruption
of Linux adoption. A number of events suggest that large firms not
participating in open source value chains might exploit their portfolio
against firms that are participating in those value chains.180 It is not
clear, however, that the enforcement risk in fact is substantial.
First and most important, the risk remains largely hypothetical.
There has not yet been a patent infringement suit challenging the use
or development of Linux or any of the major open source programs.
Indeed, it appears that 2006 has brought some of the first patent in178. Sean Michael Kerner, Linux’s Patent Risk, INTERNETNEWS, Aug. 2, 2004,
http://www.internetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3389071.
179. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
180. A salient event here is the controversy over Sun’s willingness to enter into a crosslicensing agreement with Microsoft that extends protection from Microsoft’s portfolio to
Sun’s proprietary products but not to OpenOffice, an open source suite based on code donated by Sun.
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fringement lawsuits of any type against open source programs, and it
is not yet clear that any of those lawsuits will be significant.181
Second, the risk of litigation is easily overstated. This fear stems
from three factors. First, there are thousands of software patents that
cover open source software programs — perhaps ten thousand patents
that cover operating systems alone, so the risk of infringement is high.
Second, open source developers often do not obtain patents, suggesting that they are unconcerned with potential infringement. Third, infringement by open source products is more detectable than
infringement by proprietary products because the source code will
182
display the algorithm of the software.
The first of these three factors is undermined by the limited usefulness of patents as a tool for appropriating innovations in software.
Most patents on software innovations are not sufficiently robust to
prevent competitors from developing non-infringing programs that
include the functionality of the innovation represented by the pat183
This is true for a variety of reasons, the most important of
ent.
which is that the pattern of software innovation provides multiple
paths to most design problems.
The first and second factors are undermined by the fact that at
least some of the largest firms in the industry have patent-reviewing
practices that avoid and minimize interference with issued patents.
Executives at more than one of the firms with whom I spoke indicated
that they have routine programs that monitor patents as they are issued, watching for patent claims that might read on products of the
184
firm. Lawyers in these programs commonly discover such patents,
and the firms respond promptly to alleviate the problem. Depending
on the seriousness of the problem, a range of obvious responses ap181. One public example involves a suit by a software startup called FireStar against Red
Hat, challenging Red Hat’s use of certain database technology that Red Hat recently acquired when it purchased JBoss. Bruce Perens, The Monster Arrives: Software Patent Lawsuits Against Open Source Developers, TECHNOCRAT.NET, June 30, 2006, http://
technocrat.net/d/2006/6/30/5032. Another is a claim by Michael Katzer and KAM against
Bob Jacobsen, who has developed a successful open-source program for controlling model
railroads. Id. The most significant threat appears to be the initiation of litigation by Blackboard against other e-learning technologies, which is widely viewed as a threat to a number
of related open source projects. See Posting of John Ottaviani to Eric Goldman: Technology
& Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/blackboard_pate.htm
(Aug. 8, 2006, 20:14 EST).
Another significant event on that front is Kodak’s recent successful lawsuit against Sun
claiming that Sun’s Java technology infringed Kodak patents inherited from Wang Laboratories. Industry observers worry that the basic operations at issue in the litigation are used in
a variety of existing open source products, which thus could be vulnerable to similar challenges by Kodak. Given Kodak’s relatively poor position in its major existing market, Kodak has almost as little to lose as SCO by aggressive litigation. Interviews with Software
Executives, supra note 5.
182. See Zittrain, supra note 96, at 285–86.
183. Mann, supra note 1, at 978–80.
184. Interviews with Software Executives, supra note 5.
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pears: ignore the patent, on the premise that it is either invalid or does
not extend to the product in question; rewrite the software to avoid the
patent; obtain a license from the patentee; or acquire the patentee or
the patent.
All of these responses are common in the industry, individually
and in combination. The OSDL engages in similar activity with respect to commercially significant open source programs like Linux
and Apache. Collectively, these two criticisms undermine the first and
second factors above, because they suggest that however many patents there might be that affect commercially important open source
programs, the likelihood of a serious problem of infringement is relatively slight.
The second factor about developers being unconcerned with patent infringement is becoming less true even in the open source community. Whatever might be true for the “hard-core” portions of the
community associated with the Free Software Foundation, “disdain”
for patents is no longer a catechism for players like the OSDL group
that are fostering the commercially important open source programs.
There is every reason to believe that those firms will make their patents available to the extent necessary to protect users of open source
software. Indeed, one executive at an OSDL firm suggested that a
relatively common response to the issuance of a third-party patent that
affects Linux is for a member of the OSDL group to grant formal access to a patent necessary to work around the third-party patent.
With that information in mind, we might think that the likelihood
of a risk of infringement is about as serious for the commercially important proprietary products (from firms like Microsoft and Adobe) as
it is for open source products. In either case, the risk of litigation will
be serious only if the two camps go into an open war enforcing their
patents against each other — an outcome that seems most unlikely
185
under current conditions — or if a party such as a troll that is outside the existing industry holds the patent. It certainly is plausible that
a troll could obtain a “nuclear bomb” patent that would read onto major commercial software platforms. It is hard to say, however, that
Linux is categorically more vulnerable to such an attack than Windows, if only because the OSDL group collectively has many more
patents with which to justify its activities than any single developer of
proprietary products (even Microsoft). A single shared pool among all
in the industry might resist such an attack more readily than the silos
of patents that currently exist, but it is not obvious that one or the
other silo is less capable of protecting itself.

185. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 1, at 1005 (providing reasons why IBM does not stringently enforce its patents).
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V. CONCLUSION
Some academics see the open source movement as a victim of an
excessive intellectual property system and fear that it cannot coexist
with the commercial development model, which depends on increasingly large patent portfolios. Others see it as the best antidote for a
broken IP system and hope that it will force software firms to gravitate towards business models that do not rely on IP protections, even
if those models provide lower returns. Still others see the movement
as a case study on the unsuitability of traditional development models
that depend on appropriating the returns to research and development
through IP investments and predict the abandonment of IP-centric
development models.
This Article fleshes out those ideas and tests their limits. The
foundational claim of this paper is that the open source model is
largely consistent with current economic theories about optimal ways
of leveraging R&D to serve the distinct needs of different end-user
markets. I argue that commercial participants form collaborative development communities, mirroring the more typical firm-based development processes that depend directly on off-the-shelf IP rules. They
do this when it is more efficient to invest in inter-firm innovative activities, and they use traditional appropriation mechanisms when intrafirm activities make more sense.
It is difficult to assess whether either model would be more successful without the influence of the other. Given the lower returns
experienced by some of the commercial participants, there is some
reason to believe that firms are being drawn to open source development as a second-best outcome: as it becomes increasingly difficult to
maintain competitive differentiation with a traditional development
structure, open source offers a promising alternative tactic. The ongoing strategic repositioning renders the structure of the industry far too
fluid to assess that point fully at this time. The most that can be said is
that there is every reason to believe that the optimal allocation of the
different models depends on the specific technology and markets involved.
Similarly, although the open source model seems to have much to
lose from the patent system, it is far from clear that it would work
without it. Many of the principal participants are large patentees.
Those firms continue to develop proprietary hardware and software
products. Patents are an important way to protect the underlying R&D
investments, and increasingly are used to generate licensing revenues.
The open source movement, in turn, depends heavily on the involvement of commercial participants for legitimacy in the eyes of enterprise users.
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In the end, it seems certain that the different models will be
forced to coexist, in a world in which property rights will continue to
matter. In addition, if they continue to coexist, the industry will develop in a different shape than it would without the two models. I argue here that the industry will be more concentrated and harder to
enter. I may be wrong about that. But if I am right, the rise of commercial open source will have an effect far different from the vision of
open source’s creators.

